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Between the territorial waters of coastal states
there is a vast area referred to as the high seas. These
high seas which comprise over 70 per cent of the surface of
the earth contain an untold wealth of resources. Tradition-
ally these seas are free, that is, under the sovereignty of
no one, available for the use of all. The advance of tech-
nology, however, has challenged the rationale for such un-
fettered exploitation and added a third dimension of ap-
plication to the surface and waters, namely the ocean floor.
This paper examines the nature of the challenge, and the
implications of this new dimension in order to see the pres-
ent trends and requirements in the development of the
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THE REGIME FOR EXPLOITATION OF THE SEA RESOURCES ~
PAST DEVELOPMENTS AND PRESENT STATUS
CHAPTER I
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION
Freedom of the Seas
A background for discussion can begin with the his-
torical development of the doctrine of freedom of the seas,
and the nature of the recent technological accomplishments.
In early practice, a little more than five centuries ago,
nations generally contended that the sea was not free to the
navigation and use of mankind and could be appropriated.
Great sections of the sea were subject to almost total ap-
propriation, while vague and exorbitant claims were made
over other portions of the sea. Gradually the larger claims
were abandoned: those who made them found that the increase
of seaborne communications and the growth of maritime commerce
made it impractical to retain great areas of the ocean ex-
clusively for their own flags. The very nature of the sea
restricted states 1 claims to only those which they could
positively control with shore based cannon.
John C. Columbus, International Law of the Sea. 5th
ed., pp. 55-56.

The legal expression of these realities can be found
in Hugo Grotius' Mare Li be rum , written in I609. This treat-
ise, written in order to uphold the rights of the Dutch to
navigation and commerce with the Indies, despite Portugese
claims to monopoly, explains why, under 17th Century con-
ditions, the sea ought to be free.
All property is grounded upon occupation which re-
quires that movables shall be seized and immovable
things shall be enclosed; whatever therefore can not
be so seized or enclosed is incapable of being made
a subject of property. The vagrant waters of the
ocean are thus necessarily free. The right of oc-
cupation, again rests upon the fact that most things
become exhausted by promiscuous use, and that ap-
propriation consequently is the condition of their
utility to human beings. But this is not the case
with the sea; it can be exhausted neither by navi-
gation nor by fishing, that is to say. in neither of
the two ways in which it can be used.2
This appeared to be a reasonable and just principle
for at that time the resources of the sea were known only to
be an inexhaustible supply of marine life - fish, clams,
crabs, and by-products such as coral and pearls. The common
good of nations would have been impaired by any closure of
the sea. Nevertheless, Grotius 1 ideas were contested by the
Spanish and Portugese, the most eminent of whom was de
Freitas. This "Mare Clausum" school found British support in
John Selden, who defended British claims to sovereignty over
the seas adjacent to her territory for the purpose of main-
taining fishing rights in "British" seas. These positions
were compromised somewhat by acceptance in the international
Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas
, p. 22.

3sphere of the territorial sea concept. The principle of the
freedom of the high seas was soon well established and with
the continuing support of the Royal Navy and growing support
3
of the American Navy became axiomatic by the 19th Century.
The codification movements of the present century on
the whole have been most successful with this particular re-
gime. The Institute of International Lav; at Lusanne in 1927,
agreed on a Declaration which clearly summarizes the modern
legal position.
The principle of the freedom of the seas implies
specifically the following consequences: 1) free-
dom of navigation on the high seas, subject to the
exclusive control, in the absence of a convention
to the contrary, of the state whose flag is carried
by the vessel; 2) freedom of fisheries on the high
seas subject to the same control; 3) freedom to lay
submarine cables on the high seas; 4) freedom of aer-
ial circulation over the high seas.
This is essentially the same terminology used in the
Geneva Convention on the High Seas which grew out of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea, ratified by thirty-
four nations as of January 1, I966. This convention was the
least controversial and consequently was the first of the
four conventions to enter into force, the twenty-second nation
having ratified it on September 30, I962.
-'The many cases which reflect the acceptance of this
principle in the judgment are exemplified in the "Le Louis"
Case and the Marianna Flora decision. Herbert W. Briggs,
The Law of Nations, p. 328.
Columbus, op. clt ., p. 59.

Beginnings of Transition
The principle of freedom of the seas has apparently-
progressed with near-perfect success from need, to theory, to
practice, to codification, to multilateral acceptance, to
multilateral application and, therefore, to fulfillment of the
need and solution of the problem. If the subject matter, the
sea, had remained unchanged this would indeed be true. How-
ever, as early as the turn of the 19th Century certain cracks
began to appear in the foundation on which the principle of
free exploitability was built. The Bering Sea Fur Seal Arbit-
ration of I889, and the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
Arbitration of 1910, were settled on the principle of the
freedom of the seas. But the very fact that they arose as
disputes incicated that, in fact, the resources of the sea
were not unlimited and advantage could accrue to a state by
exercising sovereignty over them. Demand for the fish and
seals coupled with improved fishing and hunting methods began
to destroy the myth of limitlessness. States saw this fact
and the dangers of over exploitation and in an effort to con-
trol it entered into a number of multilateral self-restraining
treaties in the years that followed. An examination of these
treaties will show that the concern arose from fear of over
exploitation, not from a desire to exclude others for personal
commercial advantage.




5Pacific Ocean was first provided for in the convention con-
cluded at Washington on March 2, 1923. between Canada and the
United States. Regulating catches by the "closed season"
method, the convention also established an International
Fisheries Joint Commission with scientific and advisory p
powers. This original convention has been periodically up-
dated and revised. The most recent treaty became effective
in 195^. Although its benefit is questionable, this agree-
ment represents an outstanding effort for the regulation of
fisheries and the advancement of scientific research under
bilateral agreements.
On a wider scale we can see the continuing multilateral
regulation of exploitation of whales, first begun by the con-
vention concluded at Geneva on September 2k, 1931 . It has
7been ratified by twenty-six states. Subsequent revisions
and protocols to this convention have increased the numbers
of species of whales protected, required licensing and re-
ports of catches, established sanctuaries and set limits, and
provided for an international administrative organization
Q
and methods for settling disputes.
With similar intentions but less success, the North
Sea nations have attempted, since the British-French Treaty
Columbus, op. cit., p. 359.
7Ibid.
, p. 362.
%enry Rieff, The United States and the Treaty Law of
the Seas. pp . I77-I82.

6in 1839, to impose necessary regulations. The most recent is
the "European Fisheries Convention" in 1963-6^, at London
which, it is hoped, may increase the regulation of catches
and settle the question of conflicting fishing zones within
the seas immediately adjacent to the Northern European count-
Q
ries. y
The second technological development which has altered
the conditions under which the free seas doctrine was con-
ceived is the ability to exploit the mineral and non-living
resources of the sea. The law, under the freedom of the seas
principle, did recognize certain special areas of the sea bed
where a limited resource was found belonging exclusively to
one state from "time immemorial." The classic example is the
Ceylonese Pearl Beds which extend eighteen miles beyond ter-
ritorial waters. Vattel T s support for the exclusive owner-
ship of these beds was "codified" by Sir Cecil Hurst who
enunciated the conditions under which such claims could be
considered valid. First, the coastal state must have exer-
cised effective occupation of, and jurisdiction over, the
sedentary fisheries on the sea bed for a long period. Second,
there must be no interference with the fish in the waters
above the sea bed. Third, there must be no interference with
the freedom of navigation in the waters above the bed.
"The outstanding work on the history and problems in
this area is Lewis M. Alexander's Offshore Geography of
Northwe stern Europe-Political and Economic Problems of De-
limitation and Control
.
Cecil Hurst, "Continental Shelf," Grotius Transactions
,
Vol. XXIV, 19^9, pp. 153-169.

7Exploitation of the subsoil of the ocean floor was
similarly recognized as a right as long as the same rule of
non-interference was observed. The British Cornwall Sub-
marine Mines Act of 1858, stated that;
all mines and minerals lying below the low water
mark under the open sea adjacent to, but not being
part of the country of Cornwall, are vested in Her
Majesty the Queen as part of the soil and territorial
possessions of the Crown. *
The Coal Act, passed in Great Britain in 1938, asserted sim-
ilar claims. The negotiations and discussions concerning a
channel tunnel between England and France also were con-
sidered as a private issue between the two states.
Mineral exploitation did not receive the early atten-
tion or concern afforded the living resources. There was no
great demand since there was an ample supply from deposits
ashore and the technological means of exploitation did not
exist. It was the impact of these two factors - technological
advancement and commercial demand - which resulted in the
significant transition of the law, the Truman Proclamation on
the Continental Shelf, in 19^7. The Proclamation paved the
way for the 1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf which
entered into force June 10, 1964-. This convention gave the
ratifying states sovereign rights to the resources of their
continental shelves regardless of whether they had exploited
or occupied them for a long period, and allowed reasonable
interference to free navigation while exploiting their re-
11 Columbus, op. cit
., p. 62.

8sources, thereby subverting freedom of the seas to the sover-
12
eign rights to exploitation.
Modern Law and the Challenge of the Future
The pressures on the original free sea concept are
increasing in intensity. Demand for marine resources is be-
ing met by quantum jumps in technology. There is an urgent
necessity for the law to meet the challenge of these realities.
The resources of the sea are not unlimited - fur seals
have practically disappeared, tuna and sardines no longer
exist in commercial quantities on the West Coast, and shrimp
fishing on the South Eastern seaboard is suffering its fourth
straight year of famine. -^ There is considerable evidence
which points to the conclusion that this diminution 3s a re-
suit of over-fishing and not natural phenomena. Figures I
and II illustrate the fundamental laws of the dynamics of
fisheries population and show that a point of diminishing re-
turns exists. When that point is passed, the stock can be
reduced to or near extinction. The rising demand for fish can
hardly be questioned. Fish meal, with its 80 per cent pro-
tein content, is hope not only for the millions of starving
but also for the affluent of today who live under the threat
12Rieff, op. clt., p. 332.
^Remarks of Dr. W.M. Chapman, Director Division of
Resources, Van Camp Sea Food Company, given before the Marine
Technology Society, June 27, I966.
^E.S. Russell, The Overfishing Problem
.

of cannibalism by the year 2000. The cold facts of the
population increase bear this out. The human population of
earth took approximately ten thousand years to reach a total
of one billion persons by the year 1830. This figure was
doubled between I83O, and 1930. a mere one hundred years. In
the thirty-five years since 1930. we have added still another
billion. At this rate there will be six billion persons on
earth by the year 2000, and, in six hundred years, there will
be only one square yard of living space per person. Major
efforts are under way throughout the world to meet the rising
demand for fish. One of the prime objectives of the National
Science Foundation is the investigation of ocean areas to
determine the location and extent of unexploited seafood
17
supplies. ' Recent success in the Indian Ocean demonstrates
1 Rthe Foundation's effectiveness. The Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations provides technical assis-
tance to develop the fishing potential in the poorer countries
and finances and publishes research directed tox^ard more
•^Documentation of the great potential of Marine Pro-
tein Concentrate, as fish meal is now called, can be obtained
from Donald G. Sny/der, Director Bureau of Commercial Fisheries
Technological Laboratory, University of Maryland.
"-"From a statement by Dr. J. Herbert Holloman, Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology before the
House Subcommittee on Oceanography (Hearings N.O.P.L., p.
259).
'Statement by Leland J. Haworth, Director National
Science Foundation before House Subcommittee on Oceanography
(Hearings N.O.P.L., p. 519)
1
8
Richard Bader, "The International Indian Ocean Ex-





effective utilization of this resource. 7 A look at the
Soviet Union will illustrate what can and will be done on a
national level. The development in the fishing industry in
the U.S.S.R., both as regards number and type of fishing
vessels employed and the size of the catch, is truly aston-
ishing. The Soviet catch has increased by more than a mil-
lion tons since 19^-8. During this same period the number of
fishing boats increased from thirty-six thousand to sixty
thousand. The most significant increase took place in power-
ed craft, whose number jumped from 2,727 to 12,387. Of these
powered craft the most important increase was of trawlers and
factory ships - from 107 to l,785t while seiners increased
from 376 to 1.724. 20
With the exception of petroleum, mineral resources of
the sea have been largely neglected. This neglect, however,
cannot be expected to last for long. Considering only those
minerals for which science has been unable to develop syn-
thetics. and whose world-wide land deposits are fairly well
known, it can be shown that there does not exist enough copper
to duplicate in, say, Africa the American communications sys-
tem, or steel for the transportation, or silver and rare metals
21to match the existing electronics establishment. Aware of
^See Chapter III of F.A.O. Pamphlet no. 3, World Food
Problems
,
"Some Examples of Work and Progress in Fisheries."
20Statement by W.R. Chapman before House Subcommittee
on Oceanography (Hearings, p. 411) and Yearbook of Fisheries
Statistics, 1964
, p. 102.
21Remarks of Thomas M. Ware, Chairman International




this fact, it is hardly necessary to speculate about the
future demand for the known mineral deposits which exist in a
free state on the ocean floor. According to the National
Academy of Sciences, there are large quantities of phos-
phorite and manganese nodules, the latter of which contain
copper, nickel, cobalt, molybdenum, lead, zink, zirconium,
and vanadium. Estimated quantities constitute vastly greater
reserves than those on land. Furthermore, the nodules are
being continuously formed, by precipitation and chelation of
elements from the sea water; for the rarer metals, the rate
of formation is much greater than the present world con-
22
sumption. The nodules thus form a self-renewing mine.
Several permits have recently been requested from the
Department of the Interior to mine these deposits at moderate
depths (50 to 75 fathoms) off the coast of California, and a
gigantic vacuum cleaner is being built for this purpose at
Newport News Shipbuilding Company in Virginia. Commercial
mineral exploitation is not limited to the United States, but
is occurring on a world-wide basis. Industry is presently
engaged in mining diamonds off the coast of South Africa, tin
off Indonesia, iron off Japan, and coal off England. The
vast gas and oil field under the North Sea is just now in the
23
early stages of development. J
22Sumner T. Pike and Atheistan Spilhaus, Marine Resources
,
p. 7.
23Remarks by Dr. Thomas F. Bates, Science Adviser United
States Department of Interior before Marine Technology
Society, June 27, I966.
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Oceanographic research, consistently the step-child of
more glamorous scientific activity, despite its limited bud-
get is making astounding achievements which •-ill profoundly
alter man's relationship with the sea. Six years ago Jaques
Piccard and Lt. Don Walsh took the "Trieste" down 37,87^ feet
and rested on the deepest known part of the ocean. Deep
submersibles exist today which can easily navigate at 15.000
feet; we are on the verge of a breakthrough in the reduction
of the prohibitive cost of these craft by the utilization of
structural glass hulls. The United States Navy man-in- the-
sea experiments, Sea Lab I and II, mark the beginning of a
2k
momentous change.
What requirements do these changes place on inter-
national law and how has that law responded to the challenge?
For the answer one must turn to the present status and im-
plications of international law as it pertains to the exploit-
ation of natural resources in the sea. This law has developed
along two separate paths; one body of law growing up around
the resources in the sea, another pertaining to the resources
found on and under the sea bottom. One may look at the law
for each category of resource - animal, mineral, and veget-
able - found in these areas in order to more readily under-
stand the problem in its entirety.
c
^Undersea Technology
, VII, (January. I966), p. 25.

CHAPTER II
THE LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA WATER
Internal Waters and the Territorial Sea
The seas of the world form one vast interconnected
body. Therefore, discussion of the law of one portion of
these waters is necessarily related to the waters in all
other areas. Before examining the resources of the high seas
it is necessary to briefly consider those two artificially
delimited legal areas, "internal waters" and "territorial
sea, " in order to fully comprehend the pressures on and
trends of the regime of the high seas.
a) Internal waters
. It is well established under
international law that each state has full control and author-
ity within the areas of internal waters such as ports and
certain bays and gulfs. In practically all instances, the
entry of ships into such waters is subject to the consent of
the coastal state. All resources in this area are within the
complete disposition of the coastal state. Traditionally the
areas designated as internal water were limited. However,
recent decisions have opened the way to inclusion of rather
large expanses of the ocean. It is now generally regarded as
permissable to include certain indentations into the coast if
the width of the opening does not exceed twenty-four miles in
length. If the opening is wider, the coastal state may draw
the baseline at the first point where the indentation narrows

14
to twenty-four miles. The effect of placing the baseline
further from the shore is to enlarge the area of internal
waters (and, consequently, the right of exclusive exploit-
ation), to extend the limit of the territorial sea and con-
tiguous zones further out from the coast, and to affect the
limit of the continental shelf in some situations. Under
certain conditions of water-land conformation, the coastal
state may employ a straight baseline system using isolated
bits of rock and islands off shore as points on the line.
The general situation contemplated is described in Article IV
(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zones.
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented
and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along
the coast in its immediate vicinity the method of
straight baselines joining appropriate points may be
employed in drawing the baseline from which the ter-
ritorial sea is measured. ^5
The first application of this system, which preceded
its inclusion in the convention, occurred in Norway. When
challenged, it was supported by the International Court as
26
conforming with international law. As is evident, the use
of this system can have considerable impact on foreign fish-
ing activities in near coastal areas.
b) The territorial sea . The scope of state control
over the marginal waters accepted as within the territorial
-^The Law of the Sea
,
(London: Society of Comparative
Legislation and International Law, 1958), p. 5.
26
United Kingdom v Norway (Norwegian Fisheries Case) ^6
American Journal of International Law, 195:2, pp. 3^8-70.
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sea is similarly well established. Generally speaking the
coastal state has full authority over the fishing and all
other resources including those of the sea bed and subsoil of
the territorial sea.
However, a critical issue left unresolved at Geneva in
1958, and agian at the conference in i960, was that of the
permissible outer limit for the territorial sea. There are
two reasons why this question was regarded as important.
Both access to fisheries in coastal waters and access by mil-
itary vessels to important straits are, or might be, affected
by the width claimed or accepted for the territorial sea. It
is still necessary to be tentative in discussing the existence
of a general consensus among states on this issue.
The United States position, the one we claim for our-
selves and urge on others, is that three miles is the only
limit permitted by international law. At the same time,
however, there appears to be a pattern emerging which may
indicate general, if tacit, agreement that a six mile ter-
ritorial sea is permissible. In addition, there are a number
of states which claim a twelve mile territorial sea and a
very few which claim an even wider limit. The nearly univer-
sal opinion is that the latter claims are contrary to inter-
27
national law. ' It is now necessary to turn to a discussion
of the specific resources contained within the high seas.
2
'Majorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, IV,




Unquestionably the most important resource in the sea
is fish, principally pelagic species which have commercial
value. As can be easily seen, fish as a resource pose a real
dilemma to the international lawyer. They are the most uni-
versally valuable resource to be exploited and, consequently,
are in the greatest danger of over exploitation. However,
the historic rights of free exploitation makes their conser-
vation and distribution a difficult legal problem. It is
hard to assess existing rules of international law in regard
to the control or regulation of the coastal states of the
offshore fisheries, since all attempts at codification have
been unsuccessful. The Conference on the Conservation of
Resources in Rome in 1955. dramatically brought out the need.
However, the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Code,
submitted in 1956 » ^s well as the two' Geneva Conferences of
1958, and i960, failed to achieve the required international
consensus. As of June 1, I966, the present Draft Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas needs three more ratifiers before it becomes effect-
ive. The maritime nations agree on the need for conservation,
but are unable to resolve the three opposing views as to
method. The first of these is acceptance of the "special
interest" of the coastal states, that is, that any inter-
national agreement which will conserve a species of fish will
00
Garcia R.Y. Amador, Exploitat i on and Conservation of
the Resources of the Sea, p. 197.
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give a larger limit to the state whose waters are adjacent to
the fishing ground. Some small coastal countries such as
Cuba, Brazil, and Venezuela have favored this approach. The
second is control through international co-operation. This
is the principle of self-restraint between neighbors in an
area in which they have historically fished and abstention
from that area by nations which have not fished there. The
United States and Canada are the backers of this proposal.
Finally, there is unilateral regulation and enforcement. A
state which has a historic and critical economic interest in
the fishing areas adjacent to its territorial sea, can, based
on scientific evidence, declare that area necessary for con-
servation of these resources and enforce what measures are
29deemed appropriate for its own benefit. This is the basis
for the Latin American 200 mile "territorial seas." This 200
miles is the limit of the bioma in the Peruvian current off
the west coast of South America and within that area fishing
laws are unilaterally selected and enforced.
In drafting the convention on fishing, the United
Nations Conference hoped to establish a somewhat eclectic
position among these opposing views. An examination of the
specifics of this most recent expression of the law will
point up those controversial areas which bar wider acceptance
of the convention. The basic philosophy of the Draft, as
°Shigeru Oda gives an analysis of these conflicting
views which is useful despite his prejudice in favor of




expressed in Article I, is that all nations have the right
to fish, but this right is limited by the special "interest
and rights of coastal states" and the necessity for "conser-
vation of the living resources of the high seas." These
restrictions are for the good of the community as a whole,
and only through international co-operation can they be ef-
fectively implemented.
The remainder of the convention sets forth the means
by which the protection of the state's special interest and
the conservation of the fish will be accomplished. These are;
1) Self-regulating domestic laws passed by a parti-
cular state restricting its own fishing vessels. (Articles II-
III)
2) Multilateral or bilateral self-restraint through
treaty or agreement. (Articles IV-V)
3) Adoption and enforcement of unilateral conservation
measures in the high seas adjacent to territorial waters,
providing that :
(a) Multilateral negotiations have failed
(b) There is urgent need
(c) Measures are based on scientific findings
(e) The measures do not discriminate in form or
30
fact against foreign fishermen. (Article VII)
For obvious reasons, Article VII gave rise to the most
controversial issues. For some delegations these provisions
3°The Law of the Sea, p. 18.
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were manifestly contrary to established practice and to funda-
mental principles of international law, for others, they still
did not meet the real needs and legitimate claims of coastal
states. On the other hand
%
some delegations conditioned
their acceptance of a coastal state 1 s right to take conser-
vation measures unilaterally on the acceptance of the ar-
bitral obligations provided in the draft, others were reluct-
ant to accept such obligations either because they considered
them too rigid and, therefore, incompatible with the special
Interest and rights of the coastal state or because in their
view the task of the conference whould be confined to the
31
codification of the substantive law on the subject.
There are additional stumbling blocks to acceptance of
the conditions of implementation of Article VII, i.e. the
"urgent need" for conservation and the "scientific means"
adopted. These can be highly disputed within the scientific
community itself when applied to a specific species. In set-
ting forth the scientific foundation for the principle of
abstention, Richard van Clive concluded that in any applica-
tion today, other than post facto, the principle of absten-
tion can be extremely dubious. The stocks concerned must be
clearly defined geographically. Sufficient data must be.
gathered to prove the need for conservation; research and
management programs must be in force which meet the most
rigid requirements. Evidence must prove that the regulations
31 Amador, op. cit
. , p. 197.
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will stabilize and restore the stocks. Moreover, the re-
search programs roust establish the size of the maximum
32
sustainable yield. * A far greater scientific capability
than presently exists must be developed to meet these ob-
jectives. In its report to the Committee on Natural Re-
sources, the National Academy of Sciences listed specifically




Greater attention to broadly based comprehensive
studies of marine communities and their interrelationships.
2) Studies of the factors controlling infant survival
of oceanic fishes, through experimental studies in shore side
laboratories, closely integrated with studies at sea, to
provide adequate understanding of this cause of great fluct-
uations in the fish stocks. Adequate facilities for such
experimental studies are non-existent.
3) Technical developments in the field of submer-
sibles and large oceanarium-like laboratory facilities, as
well as sea going observational facilities; neither now
exists.
h) Systematic ecological mapping of the sea to pro-
vide guidance toward the most promising areas for development
of new fisheries.
5) Studies of the genetic structure and vital stat-
32United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
,
Official
Records, Vd. I, Preparatory Documents, Geneva, 24 February -
27 April, 1953, p. "60.

21
istics of populations of commercial marine organisms, to pro-
vide a firmer basis of understanding of their population
dynamics.
6) Research on the ecology of estuary areas, to pro-
vide a basis for ameliorating the effects of pollution, en-
gineering works, and other interventions by man on the
important fish populations which inhabit .these areas during
critical phases of their lives.
7) Research into the possibilities of enriching de-
sert areas of the sea by creating artificial upwellings.
The report concludes that there is vast ignorance of
the biology and life history of almost all fishes. With minor
exceptions, no one has ever observed the life history of a
single salt water pelagic fish from fertilization to mat-
urity. 53
The principal fishing nations who have refused to
ratify the convention - Japan and the Soviet Union - conduct
extensive scientific research in the oceans and are aware,
therefore, of these requirements. Until they can be met, these
nations will remain unconvinced of the need to restrict their
extensive and lucrative exploitation. The small coastal states
of the world realize their inability to prove the need for
conservation on a scientific basis, yet fear the fishing
techniques which have been destructive in the past. They
often prefer exaggerated unilateral exclusion and also oppose
33Pike and Spilhaus, op. cit





The classic expression of this dilemma may be found in
the dispute between the Republic of South Korea and Japan
over the Rhee Line. During the years of Japanese occupation
of Korea, the fishing grounds of the Yellow Sea were so badly
depleted by the Japanese beam trawlers that the fishing in
the areas was economically unproductive due to the destruction
of bottom feeding grounds and sea grasses. During the war
period and the period of occupation, Nature rectified this
destructive overfishing and productivity was largely restored.
Korean hand-fishing did not impair the stock; however it was
feared that with the re-introduction of Japanese fishermen
history would repeat itself. It was for this reason that
President Rhee established a line in international waters
based arbitrarily on the pre-peace treaty MacArthur Line and
the Korean War Sea Defense Zone. The Japanese vigorously
objected insisting on their right to freedom, of the seas.
Many clashes subsequently occurred with Japanese fishermen
being captured and tried in Korean courts. Three hundred
ships and over 3000 men were thus detained, of which 171
35
ships and twenty-seven men remain in Korean custody. Since
the collapse of the Rhee regime in the spring of 19&0, the
J The following countries had ratified the Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas as of November, 19&5: Australia, Cambodia, Columbia,
Dominican Republic, Finland, Rati, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mal-
aya, Nigeria, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Uganda, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, United States, and
Venezuela.
35Oda, op. cit
. , p. 26.
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number of incidents has decreased and some degree of accomod-
ation has been achieved under pressure from the United States.
Unfortunately this mutual accomodation, such as it is, has
not been achieved in many such disputes. The rapport between
the Soviet Union and Japan over fishing rights in the North
Pacific area seems to be evaporating. The underlying causes
of the 1960-62, "Fish V/ar" in the North Atlantic and Norwegian
37Seas remain, as Iceland obstructs all attempts at compromise.
No progress has been made with the western Latin American
states in our attempts to arrive at some understanding regard-
ing the tuna fisheries. Fines and confiscations have cost the
tuna industry $179, 000b between January 1, 1966, and June 1,
1966. 38
There is then a complete absence of positive law in
the realm of fish exploitation, and states' practices have
been erratic and contradictory. What trend, if any, has
emerged from this chaos to indicate the source of future de-
velopment of the law?
The Fishing Zone
There is general recognition today, as there has been
•^ As late as March, I966, and on numerous previous oc~
cassions, Soviet patrol craft have ordered Japanese fishermen
to leave from points 18 and more miles from the shore. State-
ment by Hon. Thomas M. Pelly before the House Subcommittee on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation (Hearings M.F.L., p. 20^),
37D.H.N. Johnson, "European Fishing Limits," Brit ish
Institute of International and Comparative Law , Spead Pub. no,
S7T96~5:
-
-^Statement of August Felando, General Manager American
Tuna Boat Association before Subcommittee on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation (Hearings M.F.L., p. 316).

for many decades, that realistic protection of coastal inter-
ests requires the state to extend certain of its regulations ,
applicable to foreign vessels, beyond the limits of its
territory as represented by the boundary of the territorial
sea. States have done so for a variety of purposes and they
continue to do so today. Presently, the most important motive
for establishing zones of limited authority beyond the ter-
ritorial sea is to acquire exclusive coastal access to fish-
ing resources. This extension of a state's jurisdiction is
closely related to the question of determining a limit for
the territorial sea. At Geneva in 1958. the most prominent
proposals for such a limit were combined with provisions for
special fisheries limits beyond the territorial sea. The
United States-Canadian proposal at Geneva in i960, which
failed to be adopted by one vote, would have established a
six mile territorial sea plus a further six mile fishing zone
which, with some qualifications, would have enabled the
coastal state to exercise the same rights over the fish re-
39
sources there as it is permitted to in the territorial sea.
Although there was general willingness, if not quite the two-
thirds approval required for adoption, to accept a contiguous
zone for fisheries, this proposition was linked to the pro-
posal for a six mile territorial sea and failed when the
latter was not accepted. Hence, the general provision on the
contiguous zone adopted at Geneva and incorporated into the
39Whiteman, op.clt. , IV, Chapter 12, pp. 1131-1140.
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Convention on the Territorial Sea as Article XXIV does not
mention fisheries as one of the purposes for which a contigu-
, 40
ous zone is permissible.
Recent developments, however, especially in Western
Europe, have implemented the United States-Canadian proposal.
The expansion of exclusive jurisdiction by means of creating
special fisheries limits, in lieu of an extension of the ter-
ritorial sea or an extreme use of the straight baseline, is
becoming so common that it suggests a definite trend toward
recognition that such zones are in accordance with inter-
im
national law.
The United States became the most recent nation to
unilaterally extend her fishing zone to a limit of twelve
miles. The Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Fish-
eries and Wildlife Conservation on the bill which provided for
such an extension and on a number of related bills, held May
24, 25, and June 1, 1966, provided a most fascinating com-
mentary on the developmental process of international law.
Johnson, op. cit . Comments on European Fisheries Con-
vention, 1963-6^ at London, and subsequent adoption of
the six mile exclusive fishing area and twelve mile re-
stricted area by Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Since
I960, twenty-seven nations have claimed contiguous extended
fishing zones. Of these ,twenty have extended it outward to
twelve miles from the coast, one has extended it to fifteen
miles, and only six claim 200 miles. In the same length of
time, eight nations have expanded their sovereignty by the
use of straight baselines and five have done so by expansion
of the territorial sea. Based on the synoptical tables con-
cerning the breadth and juridical status of the territorial
and adjacent zones prepared for the 1953, and i960 Geneva
Law of the Sea Conferences ( Law of the Sea , pp. 35-42) and
information gained from the Department of State, April I966.
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Testimony was heard first on the need for a conser-
vation zone to protect fish and preserve present United
States interests immediately off shore. The opinion from
almost all scientific witnesses, both governmental and pri-
vate, was that such a zone was neither necessary nor effective,
Mr. Giles, legal council for the Department of Commerce,
testified.
It would not appear that enactment of the proposed
legislation (twelve mile limit) would result in re-
duced imports of fish and thereby in helping to improve
our balance of payments situation and would not mat-
erially benefit the United States commercial fishing
industry at this time. On economic grounds, therefore,
we do not favor enactment of H.R. 9531.
Mr. Cain, Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Inter-
ior, said.
While the United States does not now assert fishing
jurisdiction in this nine mile zone, American fish-
ermen now fish in this zone exclusively. Except for
two or three isolated instances foreign fleets have
not fished in the zone. ^3
And, again
i
It should be pointed out that the extension of the
fisheries jurisdiction of the United States would in
most cases be of relatively little value in solving
conservation problems.^
He went on to say that a significant proportion of the fish
stocks which now support United States coastal fisheries move
42 (Hearings M.F.L., p. 245) .
43^
Nor, in the writer's view, is it likely that the much
feared Soviet fleets have any intention to, since any such
activity on their$art within twelve miles of our coast x\:ould






freely from coastal waters to offshore waters and a conser-
vation scheme which admitted of conservation measures in only
a part of the area inhabited by these stocks and left exploit-
ation of these stocks in other waters unregulated, would be a
half measure at best, and would amount to vain regulation of
American fishermen. As examples of resources, the conserva-
tion of which would be benefited little by the extension of
United States jurisdiction to twelve miles, he cited the
salmon, halibut, and king crab fisheries in waters off the
coast of Alaska.
The testimonies of the Congressional representatives
from commercial fisheries districts and of persons econom-
ically interested in the fishing industry expressed the op-
posite opinion. These witnesses almost unanimously em-
phasized the need for the establishment of a fishing zone.
The statements below are but a few of the many expressing
this view. Hon. Thomas M. Pelly of Washington testified*
Our fisheries must be protected from foreign exploit-
ation and depletion. Delay in declaring a new United
States policy to protect our fisheries, of course,
only serves to allow foreign fishing fleets to estab-
lish historic fishing rights in water off the coasts
of North America ... the Russian trawler fleet that
recently was on the West Coast, and I knox-J the same
is probably true of the Russian trawler fleet that
has been off the New England Coast, are depleting
^For example see the testimonies of Hon. Thomas N.
Dawning (Virginia), Hon. Lloyd Meeds (Washington), Hon.
Morton C.B. Rodger (Maryland), Hon. Paul Rodgers (Florida),
Hon. Ferrand J. St. German (Rhode Island) in addition to
such witnesses as the president of Fisherman's Co-operative
Association, Fishing vessel owners of Seattle, the National
Shrimp Congress, New Bedford Harbor Commission, and the
Ocean City (Md.) Marlin Club, (Hearings M.F.L.) pp. 239-325.
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our stocks of American fish.
Hon. Donald H. Clausen, California, stated*
It is vital that we take the necessary steps now to
protect our conservation efforts. Our fishermen
can not stop the invaders of these traditional fish-
ing grounds. The responsibility for any such action
lies with us. 7
Frederick L. Phebas of the Fishermen's Marketing Association
testified*
We sere faced with a foreign nation invading our narrow
West Coast continental shelf with larger and more
powerful boats pulling gigantic nets of very small
mesh size, literally denuding the same areas that
we have stabilized by our conservation methods. ^°
Hon. Hastings Kieth, Massachusetts, said;
The Soviet danger is a real one. Their fleet has
been off the coast of my district for some years.
Our yearly catch is declining while theirs has in-
creased 250 per cent since 1953. The people of my
district are very alarmed about the presence of these
ships. Conservation is the major arguement for in-,
creasing United States jurisdiction over fisheries. °
And finally, Robert Simon, representing the Governor of
Alaska, speaking of the salmon, halibut, and king crab fish-
eries off his coast said*
The United States must not sit idly by while the
important contigious fishing resources are being
harvested at an alarming rate by other nations without
regard to conservation needs. The United States
must take action to protect and preserve our coastal
fisheries. 5°
^(Hearings M.F.L., p. 257)
^7Ibid







It seems rather clear that the political pressure to
extend the United States fishing zone had much more influ-
ence on Congress than the actual facts in the case. A need
existed, but it was a need to calm the fears of worried con-
stituents and to bolster the hopes of a depressed fishing
Industry rather than any real problem of conservation or al-
location.
The Committee then turned to the selection of the best
of three alternative methods for extending the fishing zone.
The first was use of the straight baseline system to expand
our internal waters and, thus, our territorial sea. The
second was linked to the continental shelf and extended our
fishing zone to the one hundred fathom curve or twelve miles
whichever was greater. The last established a contiguous
zone for fisheries nine miles beyond the territorial sea.
The State and Defense Departments were asked to provide an
opinion as to the legality under international law of these
proposals and the possibility of detrimental effects on our
foreign policy and national security.
Commenting on the first proposal (H.R. 9530) which
essentially implements Article IV of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the Department of State
expressed the view that the geographic situation on the coasts
of a few of the states of the United States is such that it
would warrant the use of straight baselines under the Conven-
tion. However, it did not recommend that the United States
avail itself of this right since the use of straight base-
lines by the United States would encourage other countries to
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do the same, thus reducing to coastal jurisdiction large
areas now regarded as high seas. Efforts to persuade other
countries not to use straight baselines would also be adver-
sely affected. The Department of the Navy, for the Depart-
ment of Defense, concurred on the legality of such action but
put additional emphasis on the inadvisability of such a move.
They stated:
It is considered that the implementation of the
straight baseline concept by the United States
would have some adverse effects on United States
security interests because of the precedent it would
set and the encouragement it would afford for possible
similar actions by other countries, and because of
the support it would lend to the exaggerated and
illegal straight baseline claims which have been
made by some states. The United States Air Force
has similar concerns x^ith respect to freedom of air-
space above the high seas. 52
Commenting on the second proposal (H.R. 14961) for a
fishing zone to the 100 fathom contour, the Departments of
Defense and State again concurred in their opinions. The
Department of State rejected the idea on legal grounds stating
that it was "opposed to the enactment of the legislation
which has no basis in international law, and is contrary to
53the treaty commitments of the United States." The Navy
went on to say that the use of the 200 meter contour line to
Statement by Raymond T. Yingley, Assistant Legal Adviser
for Special Functional Programs Department of State, (Hearings
M.F.L., p. 273).
52Statement presented by F.R. Downers, USN, Acting Dir-
ector Legislation Division Department of the Navy, (Hearings
M.F.L., p. 242).
-^Statement presented for Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State
(Hearings M.F.L., p. 252).
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define the outer limits of this zone would lead to ambiguity,
make regulations pertaining to the zone difficult to enforce,
and confuse fishing rights with exploitation of the contin-
ental shelf, as is likely if the same boundary is used to
define the two zones.
On the last proposal (H.R. 9531, S. 2218) the Navy
deferred to the State Department's legal opinion, but expres-
sed no objection from a security viex^point since it did not
see that the twelve mile limit would in any way effect the
freedom of navigation or of overflight. The Department of
State gave its legal opinion in one concise statement?
Since the i960 Law of the Sea Conference there has
been a trend toward establishment of a twelve mile
fisheries rule in international practice. Many
states acting individually or in concert with other
states have extended or are in the process of ex-
tending their fisheries limits to twelve miles.
Such actions have no doubt been accelerated by the
support for the proposals made at the Geneva Law of
the Sea Conferences in 1958, and i960, of a fisher-
ies zone totalling twelve miles as part of a pack-
age designed to achieve international agreement on
the territorial sea. 55
Revising its opinion expressed in April, I965. that;
the United States does not recognize any unilateral
extension of either the territorial sea or zones of
exclusive fishing rights. In the matter of fisher-
ies, however, agreements between or among interested
sovereign participants are recognized. -56
The State Department goes on to say that,
In view of the recent developments in international
5^F.R. Downs, op. cit ., p. 250.
-^Douglas MacArthur, (Hearings M.F.L., p. 250).
-^"Sovereignty of the Sea," U.S. Department of Stat:
Geographical Bulletin, no. 3. April I965, p. 9.
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practice, action by the United States at this time
to establish an exclusive fisheries zone extending
nine miles beyond the territorial sea would not be
contrary to international law. The Department has
no objection from the standpoint of international
law or foreign policy to the extension of our exclu-
sive fisheries jurisdiction to twelve miles. 57
This last proposal was reported out of committee and
passed by Congress on June 15, 1966. It is clear that the
Departments of State and Defense thought that, by gaining the
twelve mile limit sought at Geneva, without compromising the
three mile territorial sea, they had achieved both of their
objectives. However, the law has come under sharp criticism
from many quarters. Myers S. McDougal, in a heated debate
with Senator Charles Pell at the Law of the Sea Institute,
berated the shortsightedness of the Government saying, "the
lesser the limit, and I almost mean all the way up to the low
58
tide line, the better for the common interest of all mankind."
Arthur Dean, speaking to the Marine Technology Society,
called the lav; a
grave mistake which could open the way for the most
blatant claims to sovereign jurisdiction which could
only end with the sovereign distribution of the high
seas . -59
Whatever the objections, they are, at this point,
largely academic. The principle danger lies in the assumption
57MacArthur, op. clt . Note that no mention is made of
Article VII of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation,
ratified by the United States, which unequivocally prohibits
unilateral extension by this method.
^ Remarks of Myers S. McDougal at opening session of the
Law of the Sea Institute, Kingston, R.I., June 27, I966.
->°Excerpt from the speech by Arthur S. Dean, "Effects of
U.S. Commitments on Ocean Exploitation,." Second Gen^o^.1
Session of Marine Technology Convention, June 28, I966.
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that this bill has solved our pressing legal need for orderly
conservation and allocation of the animal resources in the
sea. The twelve mile limit does not accomplish this task,
and lawmakers should not rest easily having appeased the vote
casting public with this half measure. A strategy still must
be developed and pursued to meet the challenge.
Vegetable Resources in the Sea
On the whole, there has been little controversy or
concern over the legal status of plant life in the sea, prim-
arily because the use of marine plants is, and will undoubt-
edly continue to be, confined to the large, attached algae
of the littoral zone. The plants of the open sea are micro-
scopic phytoplankton, not susceptible to economic harvesting.
L£toral algae are used extensively in the Orient for food,
and are used elsewhere for industrial, medicinal, and pharm-
aceutical products. ° The National Science Foundation feels
greater harvest could be made, but, to be economically
feasible, either more effective harvesting and processing
methods or the development of new products of greater value
would be required.
Where exploitation of these algae, especially kelp,
has resulted in conflicts such as between the Chinese Com-
munists and the Japanese Governments or between the United
States and Mexican Governments, the disputes have been
60
Potential Resources of the Ocean , Van Camp Sea Food







settled by bilateral accomodation. No serious problems exist
or are expected in the foreseeable future.
Mineral Resources in the Sea
Sea water contains a large variety of minerals in the
form of dissolved salts. Extraction of sea salt by solar
radiation is an ancient industry, now highly developed, for
production of sodium sulfate, magnesium cloride, magnesium,
oxychloride, cements, and bromine. Bromine and magnesium are
extracted directly from sea water by chemical and electrolytic
procedures. Except for these products, which involve quite
a simple extraction process, there are at present few op-
portunities for the use of the dissolved minerals. The total
quantity of many minerals in sea water is very great, but
they are in very dilute solution. Much higher grade "ore" is
available from terrestrial sources. 3 in the distant future,
with the depletion of other sources and with sufficiently
cheap power, the production of other minerals from the sea
may become economically expedient. Meanwhile, it is the
concern of domestic law and an international lawyer can con-
fidently dismiss it as a practical problem.
62
Pike and Spilhaus, op. cit
. , p. 7.
"3d.H. Gaber and D.F. Reynolds, "Economic Opportunities
in the Ocean," Technical Review of Battelle Memorial
Institute, 14:12, December~T965, ~p7~b\

CHAPTER III
THE LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELVES
Mineral "Resources
There is a separate body of international law which
governs the exploitation of the sea bed and subsoil; its first
principle being exclusive or sovereign rights not free use
as in the waters and surface of the sea. This principle,
presently expressed in relation to the continental shelf, is
not without early precedent. The Cornwall Submarine Act and
the plans for the British-French channel tunnel were previous-
ly mentioned. Comment on the principle can be found in the
writings of Oppenheim, Sir Cecil Hurst, °5 professor Gidel, 6 °
67
and Hackworth.
The first significant development in the consummation
of this law was the Anglo-Venezuelan Treaty of 19^2, under
which the United Kingdom and Venezuela fixed the limits of
their respective rights "to sovereignty or control" cT "parts
of the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria^ " i.e. with re-
spect to the "sea bed and subsoil outside of the territorial
64




^British Yearbook of International Law
, (1923-24), p. 34.
Columbus, International Law of the Sea , 1st ed.
, p. 5^1.
'G.H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law
, II, p. 680.
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waters of the High Contracting Parties." This was not in




in no way would the treaty affect the status of the
waters of the Gulf of Pari a or any rights of pas-
sage or navigation on the surface of the seas out-
side the^territorial waters of the Contracting
Parties. 50
However, the United States Proclamation of 19^5. is
the principal implementing antecedent of the legal continental
shelf doctrine. It stated that
5
Having concern for the urgency of conserving and
prudently utilizing its natural resources, the
Government of the United States regards the natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the con-
tinental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous
to the coast of the United States as appertaining
to the United States subject to its jurisdiction
and control. 9
The Proclamation, like the Anglo-Venezuelan Treaty, does not
affect the superjacent waters, regarding which it also de-
clares explicitly that, "the character as high seas of the
waters above the continental shelf and the right to their
70free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected,"'
This was the starting point for a number of similar unilateral
declarations by other states which claimed, with a few
significant exceptions, precisely the same thing. That this
was the point of departure for a new concept is shown in the
arbitral decision in the dispute between Petroleum Development
^^League of Nations Treaty Series , Vol. CCV, no. 4329,
p. 680.





Limited and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi in 1953. The umpire,
Lord Asquith of Bishops tone, found that since the concept of
the continental shelf was not known in 1939 f the British con-
cession granted in that year included only the soil under the
territorial waters of Abu Dhabi; that the subsoil of the
continental shelf was freely available to the Sheikh for
disposal through a second concession; that, therefore, the
British company's claim to possess a concession to the con-
71tinental shelf reserves had to be rejected.
During the early 1950' s & great academic dispute arose
as to the legal validity of the concept of the continental
shelf. Arguments pro and con were voiced at every conference
on the sea and found in many articles and publications. The
opposition based its objections principally on the contention
that effective occupation was impossible, the free seas
principle was being violated, and unilateral action by states
72did not constitute international law. This discussion
remained largely theoretical after the adoption of the Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf. This convention, drafted in
1958, became effective June 10, 1964, and has been ratified
73by twenty-nine nations.
' Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations
, p. Jlk.
72
' For an excellent summary and commentary on the op-
posing view in this dispute see Indian Yearbook of Inter-
national Affairs
, VI, 1957, "The Land Under the Sea," by G.
Goddard, pp. 81-1 03.
'-^The following countries had ratified the convention
as of November 19&5: Albania, Australia, Bulgaria, Byelo-
russia, Cambodia, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
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The essential elements of the convention are as follows:
exclusive sovereign rights are recognized to the sea bed and
subsoil resources of any continental shelf to a depth of 200
meters (100 fathoms), or beyond that limit to where the depth
of the superjacent water permits the exploitation of the
natural resources of the shelf. If a coastal state chooses
not to exploit such resources, its sovereign rights prevent
any other state from undertaking such exploitation without the
express consent of the coastal state. The treaty further
provides that the rights of the coastal state over the shelf
do not depend on occupation or on any express proclamation.
The rights of the coastal state over the shelf do not in any
manner affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as
high seas or that of the airspace above those waters. (Articles
I-III) The coastal state is entitled to construct and operate
on the continental shelf installations of various sorts nec-
essary for the exploitation of its natural resources. Safety
zones, not to exceed a distance of 500 meters from such in-
stallations, could be established by the coastal state. These
installations are denied the status of islands, lacking any
territorial sea of their own. (Article V) Where the contin-
ental shelf was adjacent to the territories of two or more
states whose coasts were opposite each other, the boundary
of the shelf belonging to such states must be determined by
Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Guatemala, Hati, Isreal,
Jamaica, Madagascar, Malaya, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal,
Rumania, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, U.S.S.R., and Venezuela.
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agreement between the states in question. Failing such agree-
ment, the boundary line would be the median line, equidistant
from the nearest points of the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of each state was measured.
Where the shelf was adjacent to the territories of two adja-
cent states, the boundary of the shelf would be determined by
the application of the principle of equidistance from the
Ik
nearest points of the relevant baselines. (Article VI)
The eight nations which lay claim to the continental
shelf, but refuse to ratify the treaty, have done so prin-
cipally because this treaty does not confer exclusive rights
75to the resources of the superjacent waters.
Animal and Vegetable Resources
The vegetable resources of the sea bottom present
essentially the same opportunities and problems as those
which float freely and, since these were previously discussed,
need not be elaborated on here.
The animal resources of the sea bottom are another story.
There is no consensus on the law governing the sedentary
76
species of sea life which inhabit the ocean floor. ' Having
7^The Law of the Sea
, p. 2h.
'^These nations are Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Korea, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. Cambodia
relinquished her claim to the superjacent waters in 19&2.
'The outstanding treatment of this problem is that done
by Richard Young entitled "Sedentary Fisheries and the
Conservation on the Continental Shelf," American Journal of
International Law, Vol. CV, (I96D, p. 359.
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accepted the principle that the continental shelf appertains
to the coastal state, there remains among nations a legal
dispute as to which species of fish "naturally" come with the
shelf and are thereby subject to sole exploitation by the
coastal state. Once again it is necessary to examine the
scientific factors involved in order to comprehend the legal
ambiguities which have resulted.
The vegetable and animal resources of the bed of the
shelf and the waters over it are extremely varied in their
individual natures and the nature of their interrelationships.
This complex is described as the "benthomic environment," ben-
thos. There are three groups in this benthos which concern
us here, a) those permanently attached to the bottom, b)
those that walk or crawl on the bottom, and, c) those that
float or swim near the bottom. Some organisms may belong to
one of these groups at one stage of their lives and to another
group at a different stage. Some of the benthonic forms may
at times draw away from the bottom; similarly some pelagic
forms may at times be found near the bottom. The precise
relation of a species with the bottom can be classified with
respect to the organism's requirements 1) for appropriate
living space, 2) for its general physiological functions,
3) for its food and nutrition and, 4) for reproduction. As
to living space, the organism lives a) within bottom mater-
ials, b) on the bottom materials by attachment, c) on the
bottom surface, lying, d) on the bottom but moving or, e) in
the waters overlying the shelf. It must be remembered,

nevertheless that all these creatures "live in the water" and
thus "could be claimed as an integral part of the "free" super-
77jacent waters above the bed.
Except in the case of certain coral, sponge, and
mollusk beds that might be clearly recognized by law as ap-
pertaining to a state from "time immemorial," the law has as
yet not succeeded in separating those species which come with
the shelf from those which do not. The state is left to choose
the interpretation which best suits its economic interests
and which it can enforce.
There is one further point of conflict between sover-
eignty over the continental shelf and the freedom to exploit
pelagic species, both recognized under international law. It
is the status of fishing structures (stakes, traps, poles,
nets) embedded in or affixed to the continental shelf outside
of territorial waters. Article XIII of the not yet accepted
Geneva Fishing Convention provides for the coastal state to
regulate such fishing if it is 'close to the territorial waters"
and has "historically done so," provided that non-nationals
are permitted on an equal footing. This is an inadequate
solution. It can be assumed that future states, in practice,
will claim the right to exclude "foreign" fixed fishing
apparatus from their sovereign territory while simultaneously
recognizing their right to construct such structures for
pelagic fishing to the extent they deem practicable.





This convention is unquestionably a great accomplish-
ment in the struggle to keep the law relevant to the changing
requirements on the world scene. It has also provided the
stability and protection necessary to generate commercial
interest. It is indeed looked upon within domestic business
circles as offering opportunities equivalent to the Oklahoma
79Land Rush of the 1890's. 7 Notwithstanding the obvious ben-
efits and optimism generated by this convention, it is
subject to several serious flaws which we shall now investigate.
In the first place, the criteria for the delimitation
of the seaward boundaries of the area of sovereignty are
artificial and inadequate. They are, in the words of Lauter-
80
pacht, "no more than figures of speech." The attempt to
use a geological excuse for legalizing the intention of ex-
propriating offshore resources was successful for the Truman
Doctrine of 1945. At that time the object was the petroleum
resources off the East and Gulf Coasts of the United States
where, coincidentally , there is a well-defined, morpholog-
ically homogenous continental shelf which changes to a contin-
ental slope at almost precisely 200 meters. The inadequacy
of this relationship between the law and the physical con-
tour beyond the three mile limit became apparent as soon as




°BYIL, (1950), p. 385.

^3
view to making similar claims. They saw them ranging from
to 800 miles in width, and subject to every imaginable geo-
graphical conformation which made their exact outer limit
81
indefinable.
It was at this point that the completely arbitrary
criterion of 100 fathoms was conceived. This exact depth was
chosen as a close approximation of the mean depth of the
world-wide continental shelf (actually seventy fathoms) but
this criterion, in effect, served to divorce the right, of
sovereignty over the adjacent sea bed from any geological
justification. However, this second criterion was found to be
lacking in utility because some continental shelves were dis-
covered to be well-defined and easily recognizable, but below
the legal depth of 200 meters (e.g. the North Sea).
A third criterion, exploitabiHty, was then added.
There was at the time no real worry over the inclusion of
this concept because, as Lauterpacht stated in 1950. "even
200 meters errs on the side of optimism when assessing the
82
capability of exploitation." These three mutually exclu-
sive, contradictory standards became part of the 1958 Con-
vention and, subsequently, the present law. In view of the
technological progress achieved to date, it can only be con-
cluded that the outer limit of the sea bottom appertaining
R1
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
PP. 39^6^
82BYIL
, (1950), p. 385.

to a coastal state is undefined.
A second major defect in the convention is the lack
of clarity regarding the exact nature of control which the
state exercises over its continental shelf. The term "sover-
eign rights" used in the convention leaves the exact nature
of the rights of the coastal state lying somewhere between
jurisdiction for orderly exploitation and complete control.
There was considerable debate at the conference over the
wording to be used in the convention and its implications.
The states which wanted greater absolute control argued that:
those submarine areas were dependent on or appurten-
ances of the mainland. Hence, the coastal state,
as a sovereign of the mainland also exercises sov-
ereignty over the continental shelf. °^
The main objections to this was that recognition of full sov-
ereignty over the continental shelf would inevitably result
in infringements on the freedoms exercised in the superjacent
waters and airspace. This danger was real for two delega-
tions, Peru and Paraguay, had already drawn these conclusions
in the course of the discussion and the same conclusion had
been reached at an earlier conference by Mexico. Trie result
of this divided opinion was compromise and confusion. On one
hand one is left with the assurance that,
contrary to some apparently informed opinions it (the
convention) does not sanction the inclusion of the
O o
For a commentary on the progression of these crit-
eria for definition of the outer limit see McDougal and
Burke, Public Order of the Ocean
, pp. 669-686.
84 .Remarks of Argentina, S.R. 4, p. 3.
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continental shelves as part of the national territory.
The competence conferred is not all embracing and in
particular it does not appear to include the full
range of the legislative authority of the state. ->
On the other hand, one cannot find what competence is spec-
ifically lacking or which portion of the legislative range
is inapplicable. For all practical purposes, the state
exercises full and absolute sovereignty regardless of the
name such sovereignty is given.
^William T. Burke, "Ocean Sciences, Technology and the
Future International Law of the Sea, " Proceedings of the




THE REGIME FOR EXPLOITATION OF SEA RESOURCES -
THE PROBLEM OF THE DEEP SEA BOTTOM
The deep sea bottom is an area consistently ignored by
the international lawyer and is the only zone of the sea
which has not been the subject of a "convention" of codifi-
cation or clarification. The reason is easily discernable.
At the Conferences of 1958, exploration and exploitation of
these areas was unimaginable. Lauterpacht, writing on the
ambiguity of boundary between the continental shelf and the
land beyond, said that "it is an academic question since man
will never in any case be able to exploit the ocean even to
86
a depth of 200 meters." Mr. Francois stated in his con-
cluding remarks before the 6th Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly (1956), in which the definition of
the continental shelf was presented.
The Commission (ILC) had not shared the apprehension
of the Norwegian delegation that the definition given
in Article 67 should lead to a division of all the
oceans among the coastal states. The time still seemed
to be remote when technical development would allow
the exploitation of the sea bed at depths over 200
meters. "?
As recently as I965, the State Department saw no concern or
86
H. Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty over Submarine Areas,"
BYIL
,
Vol. 2? (1950), p. 432.
87Whiteman, op. cit
. , p. 839.

^7
future problem with this land beyond the 100 fathom curve.
Expressing the view officially, Douglas MacArthur II, As-
sistent Secretary of State for Congressional Relations,
stated in a letter to Chairman Bonner, House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, that that Department was
unaware of a need for study of any international law or re-
lations problems relating to the development of the material
oo
resources of the deep ocean. An examination of both the
known resource potential and the intentions and capabilities
of commercial exploitation will reveal how rapidly the "im-
possible" of 1958. bas been achieved and how real a problem
is the lack of study of the international law of this area.
y
°See Apendix A for complete text of the amazing letter






In the pelagic areas of the ocean nature is working on
a grand scale to separate and concentrate many of the ele-
ments that enter sea water. The minerals that are formed in
the deep sea are frequently found in high concentrations since
in these areas of the ocean there is relatively little clastic
material deposited to dilute the chemical precipitates.
Eventually the common igneous rocks of the continents may
serve as a source of the minerals needed in any industrial
society. The pelagic sediments of the ocean, however, will
probably be considered first, for these sediments contain an
average of about ten times the amount of the industrially im-
portant metals as do the igneous rocks of the continent.
These ocean floor sediments also possess other advantages
when being considered as a material to mine. They are widely
distributed, near most markets, fine grained, unconsolidated,
and in a water atmosphere which makes the use of automated
89hydraulic systems for recovery practical. 7
°N.H. Gaber and D.F. Reynolds, "Ocean Engineering and
Oceanography from the Businessman's Viewpoint," Transactions
Marine Technology Society and American Society of Oceano-






. Red clay covers about 102 million
square kilometers of the ocean floor. At an average depth of
about 200 meters there would be some 10 tons of red clay on
the ocean floor. At an average rate of formation of five
millimeters per 1000 years, the annual rate of accumulation
of the red clay is about 5 x 10° tons. Table IV lists some
statistics concerning the amount of and rate at which the
elements are annually accumulating in these sediments. While
from a mineral resource standpoint the composition of the red
clay is not particularly startling, this material may have
some value as a raw material, to be used in the manufacturing
of products such as construction materials or it may, in the
future, serve as a source of various metals. While the aver-
age assay for alumina is about 15 per cent, individual samples
of red clay have assayed in excess of 25 per cent alumina.
Copper contents as high as 0.20 per cent have been found in
some red clays. Nickel vanadium, cobalt, lead, zirconium,
and several of the rare earth elements show up in red clays
in amounts of several hundredths of one per cent. An interest-
ing aspect of the red clays is that the valuable minerals
are generally contained in grains with a size range of 0.5
to one millimeter while the gangue materials are contained in
clay sized particles. Thus, a sizing process could easily
produce a concentrate of the valuable metals.
°°The data on amount and value of bottom sediment materials
(clay and oozes) is compiled from figures presented by John
L. Mero, President, Ocean Resources Incorporated, at the Marine




. Calcareous oozes cover some 128
million square kilometers of the ocean floor or about 36 per
cent of its total area. The average thickness of the cal-
careous ooze layers has been estimated to be about four
hundred meters. Thus, there should be at least lO1 " tons of
calcareous oozes in the ocean. These oozes are estimated to
be forming at the average rate of about one centimeter per
1000 years, thus each year some 1.5 billion tons of calcar-
eous oozes are added to the ocean floor. Limestone, for
which these oozes could be substituted is presently mined at
an annual rate of about 0.4 billion tons world-wide. If only
10 per cent of the ocean floor deposits prove minable, the
reserves would be about five million years at our present
rate of consumption. More interesting, the calcareous oozes
are accumulating about four times as fast as the world is
presently consuming limestone.
c) Sil iceous oozes. Siliceous oozes cover about
thirty-eight million square kilometers of the ocean floor.
At an assumed thickness of about two hundred meters, there
should be some 10 tons of these oozes. Normally they could
serve in most of the applications for which diatomaceous earth
is used, that is for fire and sound insulation, in light-
weight concretes, as filters, and as soil conditioners.
d) Petroleum deposits . It is easy to think of reasons
why the deep ocean floor does not contain petroleum deposits -
the thin sedimentary section, high chance of destruction of
organic matter prior to burial, probable lack of warping or
folding over many areas' and consequent lack of drive for

51
migration and existence of traps for accumulation. However,
the ocean floor is geologically complex. Most of it does not
contain recoverable petroleum, just as most of the land area
does not; but the possibility for petroleum cannot be ruled
91
out on this account. V.F. McKelvy of the United States
Geological Survey has advised the oil corporation prospectors
to*
consider the nutrient rich waters along the equa-
torial currents and those in polar regions that are
so productive of organisms. Consider the possible
local accumulation of moderately thick sediments
generated within the ocean by volcanic, chemical, or
biochemical processes or turbidity currents. And
consider evidence for diastrophic movements of the
ocean floor suggested by its topography and by geo-
physical observations.
A real coincidence or concatenation of these phen-
omena might well lead to the accumulation of petrol-
eum. With the possible lateral shift of ocean currents
over geologic times, with polar migration, and with
continental and island development, favorable envir-
onments might be widely distributed.'
Oil seeps are knoiwi in the Gulf of Mexico beyond the
limits of the continental shelves and numerous structures
suggestive of salt domes have been identified there in the
93Sigsbee Beep.^ The Mozambique Channel between Madagascar
and the African Continent is believed to be underlain by a
^L.G. Weeks, "World Offshore Petroleum Resources,"
Bulleti n American Association of Petroleum Geologists , Vol.
IXC (1965), PP. 1680-1693.
™~
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E.V. Mcjkelvey and Chase Livingston, "Selecting Areas





^G.E. Murray, "Salt Structures of Gulf of Mexico Basin,"
a review in the Bulletin Ameri can Association of Petroleum
Geologists
, Vol. C, p. 439-4-76T
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large synclinorium and seismic profiling has identified
many areas in all the oceans in which there appear to be sed-
iments four to five kilometers in thickness. It is not pos-
sible yet to say that these or other structures contain re-
coverable petroleum. However, the petroleum industry, fully
aware of this potential and the magnitude of future needs for
petroleum, is engaged in serious study of these areas.
e) Manganese nodules . These small, black to brown
friable concretions were discovered to be widely distributed
through out the three major oceans of the world almost one
hundred years ago by the famous "Challenger" and "Albatross"
expeditions. It is estimated that there are some 1.5 trillion
tons of manganese nodules on the Pacific Ocean floor alone
and that they are forming in this ocean at an annual rate of
about ten million tons. Averaging four centimeters in dia-
meter and lying loose at the surface of the sea floor sediments,
they are found in concentrations as high as 100,000 tons per
square mile. The manganese nodules from present calculations
are indicated to be highly economic to mine. Grading as high
as 2.5 per cent copper, 20 per cent nickel, 0.3 per cent cobalt,
and 2>G per cent manganese in the same deposit, or as high as
2.1 per cent cobalt or 50 per cent manganese in other individ-
ual deposits, the ocean floor manganese nodules would be
considered as high grade ore if found on the continents.
94See U.S. Geological Survey Map, 1-380, I963, "The
Indian Ocean, the Geology of its Bordering Lands and the Con-
figuation of its Floor."
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Another interesting aspect of these nodules is that over a
large lateral distance their composition varies markedly.
Thus a mine site can be shifted into these deposits with a mix
of metals that is most amenable to market conditions. Flex-
ibility such as this in choosing the grade of material to be
mined is a great advantage and one which the mining industry
does not normally have in land mines.
Table III lists statistics concerning the amounts of
various elements in the nodules and the land deposits. It
can be seen that many elements are accumulating in the man-
ganese nodules now forming on the Pacific floor faster than
they are presently being consumed. In fact, three times as
fast in the case of manganese, twice as fast in the case of
cobalt, and as fast in the case of nickel. Like many other
mineral deposits of the sea, the manganese nodules would be a
renewable resource; but this fact is today of academic inter-
est only, for the sea bed reserves of the minerals contained
in presently minable deposits are generally measured in terms
95
of hundreds of thousands of years.
f) Hot springs manganese deposits. From an economic
standpoint, the most interesting sediments are the thick,
high grade deposits of manganese oxides or carbonates as-
sociated with submarine hot springs or volcanic exhalations.
D.F. Hewett has described these deposits rather fully. They
are of high quality, range from a few to scores of feet in
95
'^John Mero, op. cit.
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96thickness, and are non-nodular in texture. Unlike many of
the nodular occurrences, which are scattered over a wide area
and accumulate very slowly, the stratified deposits are lens-
shaped and are confined to areas a few or a few tens of miles
in size and accumulate very rapidly. These precipitates only
recently have been identified from the submarine Banu Nuhu
Volcano (Indonesia), in the deeps of the Red Sea, and off the
Southern coast of Japan. Areas of active or recently active
97
volcanism are the prime targets for such deposits.
Although the facts related above may seem impressive
when first encountered, they have been either known or sur-
98
mised for a number of years. The minerals themselves offer
no more problem to the lawyer than do Saturn or Venus. For
without the technological means to gain access to the deep
sea and to recover them, the minerals have no real value. It
is man's technological achievement which has altered the nat-
ure of the deep sea bottom and has added a new dimension to
the law of the sea. In order to understand the extent of this
change it is necessary to examine in greater detail the
present and projected technological developments.
° D.F. Hewett, "Stratified Deposits of the Oxides and
Carbonates of Manganese," mimographed paper soon to be pub-
lished in Sconomic Geology .
"'A.R. Kinkel, "Massive Pyritic Deposits Related to
Volcanism and Possible Methods of Emplacement" to be published
in Economic Geology
.
° For an example see the report on the deep sea de-
posits contained in the report of the scientific results of
the voyage of "H.M.S. Challenger," published in London in






As recounted earlier, the
"Trieste" penetrated the Marianas Trench to the deepest known
part of the ocean in 1956. The unmaneuverable, bulky, and
dangerous "Trieste" is a relic when compared with our pres-
ent family of deep diving submersibles. In the deep diving
class are included both the "Aluminaut , " and North Amejbcan's
"Beaver" x^hich can operate to a depth of 15,000 feet. In the
mid-range class (2000-6000 feet) are the U. S. Navy's "Alvin,
"
"Deep Jeep," and "Moray;" and industry operated vehicles such
as Lockheed's "Deep Quest," a 6000 footer and Westinghouse '
s
successfully tested "Deepstar. " This ^000 foot craft modeled
on Cousteau's diving saucer is the prototype of a 12,000 and
20,000 foot version. The most recent addition to General
Dynamics' "Star" family, the "Star III," has a maximum 1,200
foot depth. One of the most promising of all is the little
publicized "DOWB" being built by General Motors, a deep ocean
work boat with advanced hull design, precision maneuvering,
99
and great durability and versatility.
b) Unmanned submersibles . There are a variety of
these "robot" devices the most successful and famous of which
is the military "CURV" of Palomares fame. It is mobile in
three dimensions and operates at a maximum depth of 2000
feet. Another successful telechiric system was developed at
99
With the exception of General Motors, each developing
company has available for distribution a publication des-
cribing in detail the capabilities of its submersible.
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the Applied Physics Laboratory at the University of Washington,
This research vehicle can be commanded at a depth of 6000 feet
v A A . 100by coded sonar pulses.
c ) Man in the sea . One of the most dramatic extensions
of man's capability has been the improvement of his ability
to operate independantly at ever increasing depths for ever
lengthening periods of time. Dr. C.J. Lambert son contends
that there is presently no physiological barrier to prohibit
a man from descending to a depth of 1000 feet and performing
almost normally. Yves Cousteau has developed the proto-
type of the mechanical apparatus that would permit such a
dive, and is experimenting on nitrogen-hydrogen-oxygen mix-
102
tures to permit even greater depths. Within ten years,
Cousteau contends, he will be able to put a free swimmer at
5000 feet. In the U. S. Navy's Sea Lab II experiment, twenty-
eight men lived forty-five days inside a fifty-seven foot
chamber at a depth of 205 feet. So successful was the ex-
periment that a similar one, Sea Lab III, will be run in I967.
The chamber will be placed in ^30 feet of water and dives to
103
a depth of 600 feet will be made.
100
From data received from Thomas F. Horton, Manager
Deep Star Systems Marketing, Westinghouse Corporation.
10I
The theme of a paper presented by Dr. D.J. Lam-
bertsen, Professor of Pharmacology, School of Medicine,
University of Pennsylvania, entitled "Physiological Barriers
and Break Through ;s in Undersea Activity."
102ibia.
103^
"Sea Lab II: A Summary Report," O.N.R. Department of




Man has developed a parallel capability to recover
minerals in this environment which has so recently become
accessible.
a) Drilling (petroleum, gas, and sulfur ). In 1961,
the Federal Government opened the lands off the coast of
California to competitive bidding for oil leases. To cope
with the environmental conditions which exist there, relat-
ively deep water and rugged bottom, an "alternative to the
bottom supported shallow rig used in the Gulf of Mexico had
to be developed. The solution was a floating, semi-submer-
sible, dynamically positioned drilling rig. In I962, Shell
Oil Company drilled the first well from a floating platform
in 250 feet of water. In 1964, Shell drilled in 514 feet of
water, and, this year, a well was sunk in 632 feet, the
104deepest yet. Today there are 215 mobile and floating rigs
operating in waters throughout the world. In Project Mohole,
the deep crustal study sponsored by the National Science
Foundation, it is planned to use a more sophisticated rig of
this type to drill in 14,000 feet of water near the Hawaiian
105
Islands and penetrate the earth surface to 17,000 feet.
b) Mining . There are presently two experimental types
of surface dredges capable of recovering unconsolidated '. 1
°\.E. Montgomery, Shell Oil Company, "Drilling in the
Sea From Floating Platforms," Transactions MTS Convention,
pp. 230-31.
5 Gorden G. Lill, Director Project Mohole, "Mohole
Project," Oceanology Yearbook , I967, p. 62.
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minerals beyond the 600 foot mark. They are the airlift,
with a 1,500 foot operating depth, and the less expensive,
deeper operating dragline which can be used to a depth of
1 o A
5000 feet. Figure IV shows the approximate time table for
the development of economic mining systems. This time table,
obtained from International Minerals and Chemical Corporation,
Skokie, Illinois, is of particular significance because it
represents the actual outlook of a realistic profit- conscious
mining company.
c) Telemanipulation systems (THS) . TMS is a generic
term for systems used to accomplish manual tasks at or near
the sea floor. Such systems have provided man with the cap-
ability to install, operate, and maintain sea floor facilities
and installations. Although there are many such systems in
existence, two examples will show their amazing versatility
and capability. The first, "CURV" (cable controlled under-
water research vehicle) uses television and sonar to locate
a target. It then uses a grasping device to either attach a
line to the object or to carry the object back to the mother
ship. The external manipulator arms aboard the "Beaver" are
typical of those on the manned submersibles mentioned pre-
viously. "Beaver" has both a hydraulic grappling arm and a
manipulator arm with nine interchangeable heads. These heads
include a jet pump which delivers a stream of water with a
1 C\f\
C.G. Wellington and M.J. Cruckshank, "Review of Avail-
able Hardware Needed for Undersea Mining, " Transactions MTS
Convention
, I966, p. 108.
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central velocity of three FPS at a range of six feet from the
submerged nozzle, an impact wrench capable of 1 3/^ inch bolts,
a stud gun which can penetrate one inch naval steel and im-
plant studs of 8000 pound lead rating, a hook claw which can
carry, shear, twist, and grip, a chuck for drill, grinding
wheels, wire brushes, and a cable cutter. Figure V shows
the oil well head installation tasks, previously performed
by a diver in shallow water, which can noitf be done at 2000
feet by "Beaver." 10^
The legal implications of all these facts are clear.
Man has the capability and the incentive to exploit the re-
sources beyond the geographical continental shelf and at far
greater depths than 600 feet. The continental shelves com-
prise about 8 per cent of the ocean floor. At present an
additional 22 per cent of deep sea bottom is exploitable,
within five years this figure will jump to 3^ Per cent, an
area larger than the continental land masses of the world.
This land will not become accessible in a steady outward pro-
gression from the continents; open areas will often be geo-
logically unrelated and physically removed from the contin-
ents. Examples of such accessible zones are the Rockall
Bank, the Arafural Sea, the Gulf of Siam, the Yellow Sea, the
Bering Sea, the New Zealand Plateau, and parts of the Mid
107
'"Task Analysis of Offshore Oil Development," a pam-
phlet describing the capabilities of "Beaver," published by




Indian Ridge, Pacific Antarctic Ridge, and Mid Atlantic Ridge.
In addition to these general areas, there are the sea mounts.
Since the first one was discovered during World War II by the
American geologist, H.H. Hess, approximately 10,000 of these
flat- topped, conical shaped mountains have been discovered at
depths of 90 to 500 feet below the surface. Plans are being
made to use these sea mounts as platforms for exploitation
1 nft
colonies with Sea Lab type installations.
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For easy identification of these areas and a per-
spective of the exploitable areas of the ocean bottom refer
to H0-W/000 Series, "World Bottom Contour Chart," U.S. Navy
Hydrographic Office, Washington, D.C.

CHAPTER V
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE
DEEP SEA BOTTOM
A biological survey completed by Woods Hole Oceano-
graphic Institution in I965, reports an abundance of phos-
phorite and crusts and nodules of manganese oxide on the
Blake Plateau, just off the South Eastern coast of the United
States. The encrustations are solid looking coatings on the
bottom covering continuous areas of at least ten square
meters. The water over these is between 750 and 1,500 meters
deep. The Blake Plateau is adjacent to the continental shelf,
however, it is a separate, unrelated deep sea area, '
Is the wealth of the Blake Plateau equally available
to all nations, or does this area, sixty miles off the Flor-
ida coast, appertain to the United States by virtue of its
being an area "where the depth of the superjacent waters ad-
110
mits of the exploitation of the natural resources?" Does
it appertain to the Bahamas Islands, or half to each? Un-
fortunately no case precedents, treaties, or proclamations
exist which clarify the ambiguities of the Geneva Convention
of the Continental Shelf. Furthermore, academic writers and
^K.O. Emery, "Some Potential Mineral Resources of the
Atlantic Continental Margin," U.S. Geological Survey Profes-
sional Paper, 525C p. CI 59.
*l°Artlcle I, Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.

62
111jurists have been significantly reticent on the subject.
Legal staffs of individual companies as well as the staffs
of trade organizations such as the American Petroleum In-
stitute are extremely reluctant to discuss the subject with
outsiders. However, there has not been a complete lack of
discussion on the subject and generally two schools of thought
exist concerning the proper interpretation of the law. These
can be classified as the restrictive and the expansive
schools.
Restri ctive School
In essence, this school maintains that no state has
the right to unilaterally exercise its sovereignty or its
jurisdiction and control over minerals lying on or beneath
the ocean floor beyond the continental shelf. This school
concludes from the shelf convention that, for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, the natural resources of the con-
tinental shelf, the coastal state exercises sovereign rights
over the shelf only to a superjacent water depth of 200
meters. If a state's shelf extends beyond a superjacent
water depth of 200 meters, the state exercises sovereignty
over that portion of shelf which admits of exploitation, the
furthermost limit of sovereignty being the geographic edge of
111
The only two published works which specifically ad-
dress themselves to the resources of the sea and international
law are Shigeru Oda's, ' The Internat i onal Control of Sea Re -
sources " and "The Exploitation and Conservation of the Re-
sources of the Sea by Garcia Amador. Each devotes one" para-
graph to that land beyond the continental shelf. Other pre-
sentations, papers, or lectures which do exist have been almost
entirely prepared since January 1, 19&6.
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the continental shelf, i.e. that part at which the shelf
11?breaks sharply downward. Restrictivists refute the argu-
ment that the continental slope, since it forms a part of the
undersea geographic extension of the coastal state, should
be subject to that state's sovereign control. They show that
it is dubious that the drafters of the convention had this in
mind. It is argued first that the drafters used the term
"continental shelf" rather than "continental shelf and con-
tinental slope" and, secondly that they used an ocean depth
and exploitability test rather than a test tied to the
natural undersea geographic extension of the coastal state
itself. If their intention had been to include the contin-
ental slope the drafters probably could have formulated a
more precise definition. They could have given to coastal
states sovereign rights over the undersea lands which flow
naturally from the state to the sea, terminating the defini-
tion at that point where the land mass reaches the ocean
bottom. Additionally, oceanographers make a distinction be-
tween the continental shelf and the continental slope and,
since the drafters relied at least partially on geographic
considerations, it is reasonable to assume that the drafters
made the same distinction. Finally, Webster's definition of
the continental shelf makes a clear distinction between the
119
This summary of the restrictivist school is based on
the presentation by William C. Tubman of Kennicott Copper
Corporation entitled "The Legal Status of Minerals Located on
or Beneath the Ocean Floor Beyond the Continental Shelf."
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shelf and the continental slope in the following manner:
A continental shelf of variable width forming a border
to nearly every continent. The water above it is
comparatively shallow (usually less than 100 fathoms).
The rapid descent from it to the ocean depths is
known as the continental slope. * 3
Further analysis shows that the geographic concept of the
continental shelf includes the convention concept of the
shelf but that the convention concept does not include at all
times the geographic concept. Legally, then, those states
that have consented to the convention have agreed thereby to
delimit their sovereignty at that point where the shelf, as
it is defined in the convention, ceases. This point need not
coincide with the geographic extent of the shelf; whether or
not it does depends upon the coastal state's ability to ex-
ploit the shelf to its geographic limit.
The following statements extracted from the record of
meetings of delegates to the 1958 Geneva Conference supports
this restrictive view:
Miss Gutteridge, the United Kingdom delegate, com-
menting on the exploitability criterion was summarized as
saying, "tthe criterion of exploitability needed further con-
sideration, since it was open to the criticism that it would
114
make the extent of the continental shelf uncertain." If
the right of exploitability were to extend, without limit, to
H3webster f s New International Dictionary, 2nd ed. una-
bridged, G. & C. Merriam Company, I966.
114Official Records of the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, Vol. VI, A/Conf. 13/42, p. 4.
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sea there would be no reason for the United Kingdom dele-
gate to voice concern over the uncertainties. She further
stated that "she felt that the article should also apply to
detached areas of the shelf in proximity to the continental
shelf." -> The use of the words "detached area" could con-
note that the speaker was contemplating a geographic de-
finition of the continental shelf rather .than some legal con-
cept of the shelf.
Mr. Carl Sable, the Norwegian delegate, was summarized
as follows! "although the conception of the continental shelf
in the International Law Commission's draft was not based
strictly on geographic considerations, it has been greatly
116
influenced by them." Thus he intimated that the bases for
the definition of the continental shelf were not only geology
but also exploitability and the 200 meter test and that these
two might legally modify the extent of a particular geo-
graphic continental shelf that a state may claim.
Garcia Amador, the Cuban delegate, in urging the
acceptance by the conference of the exploitability test xvas
summarized as follows: "... for his country the problem under
consideration was an academic one since the continental shelf
11?
lies entirely under internal waters of the territorial sea."
^Official Records of the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, Vol. VI, A/Conf. 13/^2, p. W.
n6ibid.
U7 Ibld., p. 25.
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It is argued that if Mr. Amador understood the exploitation
criterion to extend beyond the geographic limitation of the
shelf, how would he be able to say with apparent certainty
that the problem is academic unless he had in mind a geo-
graphic definition of the continental shelf?
In summary, there are two "convention" tests, depth and
exploitability, both of which can be applied to the geo-
graphic continental shelf. What is the purpose of the depth
test? Why did not the delegates submit the exploitability
test by itself and not consider depth? Why not give the
coastal state sovereign rights as far to sea as that state
can exploit the sea bed and subsoil? The 200 meter test,
according to the restrictive school, is the first criterion
to be applied because that is the generally accepted water
depth at the point where the continental slope commences. The
delegates knew that this was an imperfect definition, since
the shelf at times extends beyond and beneath a much greater
water depth and, therefore, they fastened a further condition.
This additional condition was exploitability beyond the 200
meter depth which would give to the coastal state a reason-
able working rule to follow in exercising its sovereign
rights to the continental shelf.
Expansive School
The expansive interpretation of the convention takes
quite the opposite view from that expressed above. It es-
sentially sees the addition of the exploitability criterion
as providing an open end to the seaward extension of the
territory over which the state may exercise its sovereign
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rights. The continental shelf, in their view, is not used in
the geological sense and could as easily be replaced with
some less confusing term such as' "submarine area."
.
The wording of the convention's definition of the con-
tinental shelf is such that it leaves no doubt that the area
referred to is all that submarine area adjacent to the
coastal state to a depth of 200 meters or beyond to a depth
where the water admits of exploitation, regardless of the
existence or non-existence of a morphologically homogeneous
geologically recognizable continental shelf.
In order to substantiate this position it is necessary
to look at the interpretation placed on this definition by the
International Law Commission (ILC) who submitted the draft,
the Fourth Committee (continental shelf) of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea of 1958, who accepted the
draft, and the nations who ratified it.
In regard to the definition of the continental shelf,
the ILC stated that;
While adopting, to a certain extent, the geographical
test for the continental shelf as the basis of the
Juridical definition of the term, the Commission
therefore in no way holds that the existence of a
continental shelf, in the geological sense as gen-
erally understood is essential for the exercise of
the rights of the coastal state as defined in these
Articles. Thus if, as is the case in the Persian
Gulf, the submarine areas never reach the depth of
200 meters, the fact is irrelevant for the purposes
of the present Article. Again, exploitation of a
submarine area at a depth exceeding 200 meters is
11ft
Young, "The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath
the High Seas," AJIL, Vol. **5, PP. 227-8.
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not contrary to the present rules, merely because






The Commission further stated that:
Noting that it was departing from the strictly geo-
logical concept of the term, inter alia, in view of
the inclusion of exploitable areas beyond the depth of
200 meters, the Commission considered the possibility
of adopting a term other than "continental shelf."
It considered whether it would not be better, in
conformity with the usage employed in certain sci-
entific works and also in some national laws and in-
ternational instruments, to call these regions "sub-
marine areas." The majority of the Commission de-
cided to retain the term "continental shelf" because
it is in current use. ^°
In regard to the intention of the delegates, their
desire to arrive at the definition of the amount of sub-
marine area that should appertain to a coastal state based on
other than geological terms is quite clear. The preparatory
article, "Scientific Considerations Relating to the Continen-
1 21tal Shelf," pointed out the impossibility, from even a
geologist's point of view, of arriving at any concise, simple
method of using any physical definition of the continental
shelf. The shelves of the world are too varied, with too
many individual peculiarities. The ambiguity of using both
an exploitability and a geological criterion was demonstrated




. , p. 83I
.
120Ibid., pp. 831-32.
121 A/Conf. 13/37, Vol. I, p. 39.
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because it would not be clear whether all the sea
bed and subsoil below it off the coast of a given
state which could be exploited by mankind as a whole
should be taken into account, or only that part which
the coastal state itself was able to exploit. It
would be variable, because the areas concerned would
doubtless increase in extent with further technical
progress, and it was plain that such progress would
materialize. It was dangerous practice to lay down
rules which would soon stand in need of modification
.... If Article 67 (the definition of the contin-
ental shelf) were adopted as it stood, only the pro-
vision regarding possible exploitation would have any
real effect. 122
Mr. Rubio of Panama proposed an amendment to Article
67 which would,
alter the definition of the continental shelf as pro-
posed from a juridical definition to a scientific de-
finition. Distinctions should be drawn between the
continental shelf, the continental slope, and the
continental terrace. In its amendment the delegation
endeavored to mention specifically the submarine
gorges, valleys, depressions, and ravines of the
continental slope. Adoption of the amendment would
be the wisest course for deletion of all numerical
limits from the definition and fixing a geological
limitation, would clearly mark the edge of the oce-
onic depths. 2 3
At least ten delegates expressed similar doubts or open
opposition to Article 67 on these grounds. However the con-
vention, cognizant of Mr. Patey's warning, rejected Panama's
amendment and accepted the definition as it stood. It can
be concluded from the convention, as Mr. Amador concludes
today, that there exists somewhere in the center of the ocean
a series of median lines which separate the submarine areas
124
of coastal states bordering on that ocean.
122A/Conf. 13A2 , Vol. IV, p. 31. 32.
12 3A/Conf. 13A2 , Vol. IV, p. 33.
12
^Amador, op. clt . ; p. 95.
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Perhaps more significant than: the intentions or in-
tentional oversights of the delegates who drafted the con-
vention is the understanding which the ratifying states had
when acceding to the convention. As stated above, the pro-
clamations and treaties of states which would reveal their
interpretations as either restrictive or expansive are vir-
tually non-existent. One exception which sheds some light,
if not on official United States interpretation, at least on
the policy being followed by the operational agencies is a
memorandum dated May 5. 1961, to the Director, Bureau of Land
Management, Department of the Interior, from the Associate
Solicitor, Division of Public Lands, Department of the Inter-
12*5
lor. J The memorandum passes upon the propriety of leasing,
pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (^3 USCA
1331-13^3). phosphate deposits located some forty miles off
the coast of California.
The author of the memorandum related that the designated
area lies in the open sea and between this area and the main-
land lies a deep channel in which soundings are at least 600
fathoms; soundings in the designated area range between ^3
and 67O fathoms, the greater part of the area being at a
depth of far more than 100 fathoms. The question presented by
the memorandum is whether there is, in fact, a seaward limit
to the applicability of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act. After finding that "outer continental .shelf" as used in




the Act is not a geographic term, but rather "a special
statuatory definition in order that it may apply to all sub-
merged lands over which the United States has asserted juris-
diction and control seaward of the boundaries of the states,"
and interpreting Article I of the Convention of the Continen-
tal Shelf as giving to the United States "jurisdiction, con-
trol, and power of disposition" over an area such as that
designated, the memorandum concluded that:
the Act is applicable to all submerged lands seaward
of the states' boundaries of which the subsoil and
sea bed appertain to the United States and are sub-
ject to its jurisdiction and control. Since the
United States has now asserted rights to the sea bed
and subsoil as far seaward as exploitation is possible,
it is clear that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act is now applicable to all these areas. There is no
question that the area designated falls within the
scope of the definition in the Convention and is,
therefore, subject to leasing under the Act.
The author's statements could be interpreted to mean
that the United States could exercise jurisdiction and control
over the sea bed and subsoil lying beyond the continental
shelf when such area becomes susceptible to exploitation. No
where in the memorandum does the author limit the juris-
diction of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to the
furthermost edge of the geographic continental shelf. To wit,
when using the phrase "as far seaward as exploitation is
possible" the author does not join with it a limit other than
that of exploitability. On the contrary, when considering
the continental slope as the outer limit of jurisdiction to be
exercised by the United States the author states, after re-
ferring to the irregularities of the submarine terrain, that
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"this does not therefore appear to be a satisfactory test of
the seaward limit of the continental shelf." These state-
ments indicate that the author does not accept the edge of
the continental slope as the outer limit of United States
jurisdiction.
Whatever errors of interpretation may be found in the
restrictivist or expansionist analyses, the real error lies
within the convention itself for providing inherently vague
guidelines that permit the growth of such mutually contra-
dictory interpretations. An approach to the resources of
the deep ocean floor based on either of these two inter-
pretations is inadequate and carries with it promise of future
difficulty.
The restrictivist analysis fails to take into account
the need of mankind for the resources of the deep ocean and
the intention of states to provide for this need by denying
to others the territory which comes under its particular jur-
isdiction and control. It effectively removes any control
over exploitive activity. Without this control by the state,
either of two occurrences are likely. First, enterprise
would refuse to risk the investment necessary for mineral
development, for in order to make real estate valuable and
desirable to the entrepreneur it must have ascertainable
boundaries and be subject to clear and exclusive rights of
1 26
occupancy. Some provision must be made to protect the
12°Northcutt Ely, "The Laws Governing Exploitation of the
Minerals Beneath the Sea." Transactions MTS Convention , June
27, 1966, p. 378.
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investment made by the exploitive industry. Although appli-
cation for a patent to the exploitation procedure may be
obtained in any country that provided for patent protection,
an inherent risk remains. Since the material contained in
the patent would be open to public scrutiny, such information
could fall into the hands of nationals from countries in
which a patent right is not available. Therefore the protec-
tion sought by legal means would be nullified. If this lack
of protection is combined with the fact that such persons
could subsequently exploit a site in proximity to the patent
holder's activity this would result in competition from one
who neither had to go the the expense of developing his own
12?
exploitation procedure nor of locating the exploitation site.
The second event likely to occur would be the development of
activity detrimental to the general welfare. Without con-
sidering the myriad of possibilities of conflicting claims
which could generate international crises of a high order,
there is the problem of conflict of usage between fish
trawlers, oil pipelines, and mineral dredges. In addition,
pollution problems and interference with shipping lanes would
,. • 128
assuredly arise.
Acceptance of the expansive view provides no answer
for similarly serious difficulties arising from the practical






gives states offshore territory without limit. For example,
if a stranger were to find a method for drilling at great
depths at a distance of hundreds of miles from the nearest
coast line then he would automatically establish ex post
facto the exclusive jurisdiction of a coastal state which
might never have been capable of the exploitation itself, had
not licensed the exploitation, and, , indeed, might never
have heard about it in advance. The state would then acquire
sovereign powers to prohibit it, or police its operations, to
collect taxes and royalties, and to control disposition of
production. Would the state be bound to maintain order in
this new outpost of its sovereignty and protect it from
other powers? If the extreme convention interpretation is
accepted and an attempt made to actually establish a median
line in oceans the boundary language in the convention makes
borders difficult if not impossible to fix. The boundary
between nations projected outward is not a straight line like
a meridian of longitude. If the coast is sinuous and curved,
jagged or indented, the seaward boundary which must follow it
will be similarly configured. The art of navigation and
oceanic position fixing, despite recent achievements, has not
progressed to the point where it is possible to fix such
boundaries with the necessary accuracy.
Despite the wording of the law, at some great depth,
some great distance from land, the continental shelf must be
presumed to end, even as a legal fiction. When that point is
reached the land beyond it is not under the jurisdiction of
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any coastal state, outside the scope of any treaty, ungoverned
by any juridical precedent.

CHAPTER VI
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS FOR THE PROBLEM OF THE
DEEP SSA BOTTOM
The suggestion has been made that the dilemma of the
resources of the deep sea lands could be approached in sev-
eral ways. An examination of these proposals is necessary
in order to determine whether or not they will clarify the
legal status and establish a climate conducive to orderly
exploitation.
United Nations Control
The White House Conference on International Co-oper-
ation published a report in may, 1966, in which it recommended
the establishment of a specialized agency of the United
129Nations for international marine resources. 7 This agency
would be given responsibility for the management of marine
resources for the purposes of reducing the potentiality of
conflict, preventing the waste of capital and labor, and in-
suring the rational and efficient exploitation of mineral
resources. The agency would have the responsibility for
leasing inclusive rights to mine the nodules and other miner-
als on and under the ocean floor. It would have the power
'White House Conference on International Co-operation
National Citizens Commission Report of the Committee on




to promote the development of new techniques and it should
have the power to guide the use of the seas in order to pre-
vent excessive competition and depletion of the resources.
In addition, the fees collected from exploitation would pro-
vide an income which &ould enable the United Nations to
operate independently of member contributions.
In the text of the report the Committee stated that
"the possibility of exploiting the resources raises two
problems: theefficient and orderly exploitation of the nod-
ules, and the distribution or sharing of the mining rights."
Producers, it explains, must have exclusive mining rights to
areas that are sufficiently large to permit them to operate
economically and without fear of congestion or interference.
It concludes, therefore, that
if rights are to be granted for resources that are the
common property of the World Community then decisions
on the allocation of these rights or on methods of
acquisition must be made within the framework of in-
ternational law. A specialized agency of the United
Nations would be the most appropriate body for admin- .„„
istrating the distribution of exclusive mining rights. ^
It is interesting to note that only one of the forty-
1 31two members of the Commission and consultants was a lawyer. J
It is of interest also to note the legal assumption upon
which the logic of their proposal for United Nations control
was based. They state in the report that "international
marine resources are the common property of the world and not
1 30J White House Conference, op. cit
. , p. 7.




under the jurisdiction of any single nation." And again that,
"these resources - fish, and minerals beyond the continental
shelves - are clearly outside national jurisdictions." As
shown above, this fact is far from clear to a number of
lawyers and nations. The automatic equivalence between the
sea bed and the sea itself whereby both are categorized as
re s communis is, as will be seen, open to serious question.
In addition to the questionable legal basis of this
1 32proposal, it has practical operative drawbacks as well.
In the first instance a reorganization would have to take
place within the United Nations structure to provide for such
a powerful and politically influential body. Secondly, the
proposal provides for the exclusion of military usage from
this United Nations territory. Not only is this prohibition
rather tardy in view of theprogress being made at the dis-
armament conference in Geneva, but also expectations of dis-
armament of the ocean by decree from a United Nations agency
seems quite improbable. Professor Burke takes particular
exception to the financial aspect of this suggestion for both
its assumption that large sums of money would then become
available to the international institution and also that it
is desirable to support the United Nations, as presently con-
1 3?
stituted, in this way. JJ In his opinion there is good
1 32J See PadelfcJd, "Financing Peacekeeping Politics and
Crisis," International Organization , Vol. IXX, 1965* p. 444.
1 3?
-'-'Remarks by Professor William T. Burke at the opening




reason to doubt that these ocean resources represent a great
source of wealth for the United Nations or a special inter-
national organization. For the immediate future at least, it
is probable that the problems of making ocean mining competi-
tive with conventional land mining will preclude imposing
substantial royalties or fees upon these enterprises. Further-
more, Professor Burke reasons, assuming that there might be
some, even substantial, income for the international group,
the existing political situation in the United Nations sug-
gests that any international arrangement, especially if the
United Nations is involved, must insure that the new wealth
is expendable only for non-political purposes. The recent
dispute over the financing of peacekeeping operations, i\rhich
is still not satisfactorily resolved, and the continuing
disparity in the General Assembly between the voting power of
the majority and thier control of resources necessary to sup-
port the operations which they authorize by their votes are
the principal factors leading to this conclusion. It is pre-
sently inconceivable that either side in the cold war would
acquiesce to a United Nations which has an independent fin-
ancial source and which can be dominated by a large group of
states with little power or wealth of their own. This plan,
therefore, suffers a malady common to such Utopian approaches'
to international problems. It lacks both the specifics of
strategy and the acknowledgment of obstacles. The plan pro-
vides only vague hopes where a clear program of specific,




An interesting and possibly prophetic proposal on the
"exclusive" distribution of the undersea land was made by
Professors Clark and Renner of Columbia shortly after the
1 34Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf. •* They pro-
posed that the United States take many of the island pos-
sessions of the European Powers as repayment for war debts.
Then, since the United States was the world* s strongest
military power, she could use them as outposts and appro-
priate all the ocean floor lying between them and the con-
tinental mainland. The boundary that they envisioned would
run approximately from Attu In the Aleutians through Midway,
the Johnston Islands, down the Northwest Christmas Island
Ridge and the Marquesas Islands, to the Tua Motu Archipelago,
and finally up to San Diego. In the Atlantic it would run
from Newfoundland to the Virgin Islands, including the Island
of Bermuda. This would result in United States acquisition of
approximately one billion square miles of sea bottom with un-
questioned rights to the resources they contained.
Thus far nations, particularly the United States, have
been reluctant to make such an exclusive claim to such vast
territory because their knowledge of the ocean floor has been
inadequate. Nations have not been willing to make such an
acquisition until they could be more sure of what they were
1 ^4J Clark and Renner, "How the United States Can Acquire




acquiring. Such a proclamation could, perhaps, annex millions
of miles of sea bottom desert, leaving a bountiful area of
sea life or minerals nearby to a state more fortunate in the
oceanic grab bag.
Although the concept of undersea empire put forth by
Clark and Renner in 19^6, was never accepted the arguments
used to justify the Truman Proclamation could be used easily
today to justify similar acquisitions of any amount of under-
sea territory desired. By way of an example one might ex-
amine the following statement concerning the United States
continental shelf policy prepared by the Department of State
on July 3i 19^-5. The words "continental shelf" have been de-
leted to illustrate how easy it would be to substitute in
their place the name of any other desired submarine area and
how readily the same argument would apply.
In view of the long range need for new sources of
petroleum and other minerals, believed by experts to
underlie many parts of the , and in view of their
opinion that with modern technological progress,
utilization is now practible or will be in the near
future, it is desireable to assert our jurisdiction
without delay. Recognized and established interest of
their conservation and prudent utilization when devel-
opment is undertaken. Indeed it appears to be a pre-
requisite for the commencement of explorational
operations by private enterprise. In the entire
absence of foreign activities exploiting resources
of the sea bed and subsoil of off our
coasts beyond the territorial waters ( or say, con-
tinental shelf ) the United States as the coastal
nation appears to be clearly the logical government
to assert and exercise jurisdiction. In the exercise
of its rights of self-protection and as a matter of
national defense, the United States could not view
without serious concern any attempts by a foreign
power or the nationals thereof to exploit the re-
sources of at points sufficiently near to
impair or endanger the security of the United States





It is believed that international law does not pre-
vent a nation acquiring by occupation or contiguity
rights to lands beneath the high seas, provided the
freedom of navigation is not impaired. The legal
advisor of the Department (Hackworth) has given his
approval to the policy. * 35
Wait and See
Commenting on the ambiguity of the standard of ex-
ploitability in Public Order of the Ocean
,
published in I962,
Myers McDougal and. William T. Burke concluded that for the
forseeable future this dual standard of exploitability and
depth which was put forth in the Convention on the Continental
Shelf was entirely adequate for the needs of man. They
raised several points in support of this view. J
1. The standard of exploitability would encourage ex-
ploration, and exploitation in that, for a sufficient time, it
offers certainty and specification in the identification of
those responsible for authorizing and administering access to
a particular submarine area.
2. The test of effective exploitation also is essential
for the avoidance of disputes for it serves to prevent
potential foreign initiative from locating just beyond the
boundary of present exclusive control, perhaps to the detri-
ment of the shoreward exploiters. The resulting controversy
might strain to the breaking point already tense relationships.
3. Alternative solutions for the establishment of a
3->Whiteman, pp. cit
. , p. 755*
1 ?6





specific depth criterion are unsatisfactory. Such a criter-
ion would be impossible, because the disparity of the contin-
ental shelves of the world would require that the boundary be
most extensive to include all of them and undesirable because
it might be interpreted to exclude any exploitation beyond the
established limit even when such exploitation becomes pos-
sible.
Expressing this same confidence when discussing the
problem. Professor William T. Griffin stated in June, 1966,
that:
We now have a body of formulated rules of national
and international law sufficient to provide a reason-
able basis for the solution of these problems of the
orderly conduct of ocean activity for the next few
years. In the course of time experience will solve
some of the present problems, will indicate the need
and nature of clarification of others, and will dis-
close new problems. The lesson of centuries of legal
history is that law cannot be prefabricated in abstr-
act codification. 37
However wise these arguments may have been at the time
of the Geneva Conference, they are no longer valid today.
First, the vagueness of the location of state sovereignty acts
as a deterrent to investment by business interests. *
Secondly, the likelihood of disputes arising from opposite
or adjacent countries, particularly insular nations, is in-
creased as these questions of median lines and exploitation
1 3?William L. Griffin, "Development of Law for Ocean
Activities," Transactions MTS Conference , p. 356.
3#weber Alban, "Our Newest Frontier: the Sea Bottom,
Some Legal Aspects of the Continental Shelf Status," Trans-
actions MTS Conference, p. 405.
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potential arise when a valuable resource such as oil is dis-
covered. One need only consider the vast oil reserve be-
lieved to be under the North Sea. Companies are refusing to
spend the four to ten million necessary dollars to drill a
well in portions of the sea where the coastal control is in
dispute because of a difference of opinion as to the location
of the median line between Norway and England. ^° Finally,
the exploitability criterion has greater defects when com-
pared with alternative methods at the present state of tech-
nological advance. Other laws can be developed which are
based on principles of custom and equity which are more ben-
eficial to the common welfare than that body which presently
exists. The time to act is now, not in the next five or ten
years when the disputes have arisen, states have become rigid
in their attitudes, and legal formulation by accomodation is
impossible - as is currently the case in the fisheries con-
servation disputes.
1 ^9J7Paper presented by L.E. Kust, Vice President of
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, "Risk Incentives for Ocean




A PROPOSAL FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
In order to build a law which is not only realistic
and acceptable in terms of existing technological develop-
ments but which also promotes the common good, one must
consider the requirements of the exploiting industry, the
compatible or conflicting legal needs of other users of the
deep sea bottom, the inclusive interest of the world com-
munity, and the principles and precedents of existing lav;
%hich can be applied.
Legal Needs of the Exploitive Industry
Several basic elements of a favorable legal climate
must be developed before industry can be expected to under-
take the risks of undersea mining. The first of these ele-
ments is determination of which sovereign has legal com-
petence to authorize and regulate the mining of materials.
The lack of certainty existent under present law was discus-
sed above. A corollary to this element is the assurance that
the right to develop a mineral will be given to the discover-
er. Without such assurance, industry sponsored exploitation
will surely lag.
^°Paper presented by Dr. Walter R. Hubbard, Jr., Dir-




A second basic element is that industry must have suf-
ficient tenure after discovery to provide an opportunity to
recoup its investment with a reasonable chance for profit.
This element necessarily implies the right to develop mineral
reserves. The time lag between the discovery of a deposit
on land and the exploitation of the deposit on a profit
making basis is thirty years. Thirty years of stable govern-
ment, taxes, rights, and policy. The exact method of con-
ferring these rights is, of course, not of supreme importance
here; the key must be certainty of rights and certainty of
obligation, whether by lease or other means. For instance,
millions of dollars have been invested by the oil industry on
the continental shelf on the mere strength of leasehold es-
tates.
A third basic element which has an economic root is
that payments for the right to exploit continental shelf mat-
erials must be readily measurable and reasonably related to
the risks and investment required in undersea mining. If the
payment is indefinite or exorbitant in relation to these
factors industry can be expected to direct its efforts toward
more orthodox and less hazardous enterprises.
A fourth basic legal element is reasonable certainty
1 h.1
Paper presented by Chester 0. Ensign, Jr. , Chief
Geologist, Copper Range Exploration Company, "Economic
Climate Needed to Make Undersea Mining Attractive to Industry,"




of industry's detailed responsibility to operate in conformity
with the other laws of the sea. For example, pollution
which might endanger some living resource of the sea.
Another question is whether or not an industrial operator
must pay for the relocation of a submarine cable where that
relocation is reasonably necessary or convenient for the pur-
poses of mineral exploitation. What assurance will the
operator be given that the government will require such re-
location if necessary to the mineral operation. "Unjust-
ifiable" interference with navigation, fishing, and conser-
vation of living resources is forbidden. How will this be
determined, what are the justifiable interferences that will
be permitted? All this must be spelled out in arrangements
between government and industry or industry participation may
well prove to be only a pious hope.
Finally, industry must have assurance of reasonable
rights to the continuous use of ports, the territorial sea,
and international waters. If operations can be shut down for
national defense reasons, for example, for how long and under
what conditions can this be done?
The initial step in meeting these requirements is the
establishment of state jurisdiction and control by the in-
dustry's parent nation over the area to be exploited. This
must be followed by the development of domestic laws which
143
E.F. Bennet, "Legal Climate for Undersea Mining,"
Transactions, MTS Convention , June, I966.
i
^Ibid.
, p. 210. .
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will fulfill the particular requirements of both the nation
and the exploiter. The industrial developer will want jur-
isdiction and control over the area he is exploiting exercised
by his native state so he can exert domestic influence to
obtain suitable development of the catalogued elements.
Likewise, the native state has an equal interest in providing
such jurisdiction and control in order to foster its own
economy and protect its citizens. Together these provide a
strong arguement for the extension of exclusive sovereign
rights over the sea bed and subsoil.
Legal Needs of Other Sea Bed Users
A look at two other potential uses to which the ocean
floor may be put will show whether these operations strengthen
or weaken the needs of the mining industry for extension of
state sovereignty.
The most significant, of course, is military appli-
cation, a category which includes a considerable range of
operations with varying demands regarding the kind of state
authority required vis-a-vis other participants in ocean use.
The military potential of sea mounts could extend to the em-
placement of weapons systems or equipment indispensable to
the operations of systems located elsewhere including the
waters surrounding the base. Other uses would appear to be
considerably less strategic in nature such as the instal-
lation of research for direct military benefit, and the con-
struction of shelters and navigation equipment. Still other
military applications might be the operation of repair
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facilities and supply depots. Strategically located sea
mounts could be useful in missile and space operations. *
The second major user of the ocean floor is the sci-
entific community. Scientific research could be promoted on
sea mounts in a number of productive ways because of the
unique conditions there. The water serves as a barrier to
break ground radiation. Experiments in radiology, genetics,
and contamination could be conducted without heavily shielded
laboratories. The depth of these sea mounts permits em-
placement of remote data collection systems in a safe location
beneath the turbulent waters and currents which wreak havoc
with research bouys. One commentator believes that:
geophy si cists and oceanographers would have a stable,
quiet platform from which to conduct long term in-
vestigations in marine biology and no doubt numer-
ous other disciplines could be.pursued effectively
from stations on sea mounts.
The extent of claim to exclusive use for accomplish-
ment of these activities varies greatly. Certain of the
145
Remarks of Dr. William A. Nieremberg, Director, Scripps
Institute of Oceanography, Third General Session, MTS Con-
vention, June, 1966.
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Most writers holding this view state it as a matter
of fact feeling no need for explanation or defense. Dr.
William R. Chapman, for example, stated in a paper presented
to Congress that "our whole land society, government, and
institutions is based predominantly upon private or at
least governmental ownership of area and resources. From
this has built the prudent husbanding of property and re-
sources by the individual or government to increase their
economic yield or the social satisfaction to be derived from
them. All of this is changed in the ocean. Under existing
international law 70 per cent of the earth 1 s surface belongs
to everybody. This applies to the area, to the contained
resources, and to the bottom." (Hearings N.O.P.L., p. 417)
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military uses could very well entail the claim to subject an
area to the most comprehensive and exclusive control a state
could exert. Thus, for the most strategic uses, encompassing
at least weapons systems or associated equipment, it is con-
ceivable that states would regard it as important to occupy
the area and to treat it for all practical purposes as part
of its national territory. Such treatment would embrace the
exclusion of non-national vehicles either from the immediate
area or, perhaps, from access to a surrounding region suitable
for surveillance. The exclusion could also possibly ex-
tend to the surface waters. Other military uses might be
regarded as less critical and necessary protection might be
secured by lesser assertions of authority.
General scientific research would appear to generate
claims to exclusive authority in terms of the kinds of re-
search conducted. Some types might demand quiet and isola-
tion, requiring extensive assertion of authority, while others
might not.
In summary, one can readily see that the other two
principal uses to which the ocean floor may soon be put re-
inforce the movement for exclusive sovereign control.
Freedom of the Sea as a Source of Legal Precedent
As stated above, there is no body of law to which one
may turn for guidance in determining whether there "shall"
or "shall not" be exclusive sovereign control. However, there
are two indirect precepts or principles which may be searched
for precedent and points of equivalence. The first is the
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principle applied to the resources in the sea, namely the
"freedom of the seas." This bestows the right on all men to
exploit the resources in the sea on an equal basis, with no
one nation having the authority to preserve to itself the
exclusive right of exploitation or control over even the
smallest portion of the high seas. This -res communis - prin-
ciple is the guiding legal precept behind the strong in-
clusivists who propose either United Nations control or equal
exploitation of the resources of the sea bottom. This
writer, however challenges the automatic equivalence between
the sea and the sea bottom in the case of the high seas and,
therefore, the application of the law of the former to the
latter for the following reasons:
1. In its original conception the principle did not
include the sea bottom. Grotius and later proponents did not
consider utilization of the sea bottom within the realm of
practical possibility. The principle was based on the seem-
ingly inexhaustible nature of the resources in the sea, and
the fact that no part of it could be occupied. Now sea
bottom occupation has come within the realm of possibility
and we have discovered that the supply or deposit of a re-
source in a particular location is exhaustible. Without
these foundation stones, the conclusion that resources should
be exploited on an equal basis does not necessarily follow.




(Hearings N.O.P.L., p. 4-17)
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formulated to see the restrictions increase as the resources
decrease. The recent twelve mile fishing limit of the United
States is the latest of a long series of similar unilateral
extensions
.
2. In practice, as land under the sea has become
available for exploitation states have not applied the prin-
ciple of "freedom of the seas" to it. Earliest evidence of
such non-application was the Cornwall Submarine Act of 1858.
In this regard Lauterpacht states that, "on the part of a great
majority of writers there was no disposition to deny the law-
fulness of such appropriation." " As a rule, writers did
not expressly include the possibility of acquisition or
assumption of title over the subsoil of the sea as the result
or for the purpose of operations commencing from the surface
of the high seas. With isolated exceptions they were not
prepared to permit any abstract deduction from the principle
of the "freedom of the seas" to stand in the way of any
future developments. Professor Hyde, writing in 19^5* said,
The subsoil appurtenant to the coast of a state and
extending therefrom into an area beneath the high
seas is doubtless susceptible to acquisition by that
state. Accordingly by appropriate processes in-
dicative of the assertion of control, a right of
sovereignty therein may be brought into being. 5®
The Continental Shelf Convention, of course, confirms this.
148
H. Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty over Submarine Areas,"
BYIL
,
Vol. 27 (1950), p. 399.
1 ^9Ibid., p. 400.
1
^°The Law of the Sea, p. 25.
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3. The question remains whether or not there can be
any relationship between the principle of "freedom of the
seas" as applied to the res jsommuni s high seas, and the
exploitation of the sea bed and subsoil. The answer seems to
be that "freedom of the seas" becomes concerned with the
subsoil and the sea bed only when extension of sovereignty
over that area causes unreasonable interference with the two
essential purposes of the freedom of the seas - free exploit-
ation and free navigation. It is significant that bottom
related activity which i^ould result in such interference has
been clearly rejected where sovereign extension which has re-
sulted in no such interference has been readily accepted.
The wording of Articles III and V of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf clearly shows such intentions. Article III
states, "the rights of the coastal state over the continental
shelf do not effect the legal status of the superjacent
waters as high seas, or that of airspace above those waters."
Article V, paragraph 1, states that,
the exploration of the continental shelf and the
exploitation of its natural resources must not result
in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, 4
^fishing, or the conservation of the living resources."
In conclusion, it appears that the relationship bet-
ween the principle of the "freedom of the seas" and the sea
bottom is merely one of '• sic ute re tuo ut alienum non 3,aeflas' ;
and that this principle which assumes its subject the sea
151J Cecil Hurst, "Whose is the Bed of the Sea?" BYIL, Vol.
IV, (1923-24), p. 3^.

9^
water to be l : res communis ' is not directly applicable to a
different subject, the subsoil and sea bed of the ocean.
Continental Shelf Doctrine as a Source of Legal Precedent
It has been determined then that the principle of
unilateral control or "sovereign rights," not the "freedom
of the seas" has been applied to that area of the sea bed
that has, because of resource value or technological acces-
sibility, come within the purview of the law. The question
is whether unilateral control is equally applicable to that
portion of the sea bottom, the deep ocean floor, which is
just now coming within this purview, or whether the legal
bases for the titles asserted thus far have a unique nature
which limits further possible extension.
Early writers, speculating on the basis of the historic
examples of sovereign control, the pearl, oyster, and sponge
beds, were prepared to recognize title acquired in this
sphere by prescription. However, there was some question as
to the legality of future appropriations by occupation. Pro-
fessor Gidel denied the possibility while Sir Cecil Hurst
stated that such action "is not inconsistent with the uni-
versal right of navigation on the high seas or with the
1 ^2
common right of the public to fish in the high seas." J A
similar view was expressed Oppenheirr^s International Law
,
It is stated therein that although it is traditional
to base these cases on the ground of prescription it
1 ^2







is submitted that it would not be inconsistent with
principle and would be more in accord with practice
to recognize frankly that as a matter of law, a
state may by strictly local occupation acquire sov-
^
^o
ereignty and property in the surface of the sea bed.
However, it is reasonable to conclude that these
writings, expressed prior to the proclamations on the sea bed
appropriations which began in 19^-2, are of limited value for
they do not reflect any established pattern of state prac-
tice. The establishment of the basis of prescription or, in
some cases, occupation for the acquisition of title was a
deduction derived from unusual cases of such practice in Ceylon,
Madras, Tunis, Bahrein, and possibly some parts of Western
Australia. The question of appropriation by virtue of some
other title and "other considerations determined by economic
necessities and scientific progress was beyond the reach of
their vision or interest." -f
Beginning in 19^2, when economic necessity and sci-
entific progress became realities and states were goaded into
acquiring rights over more of the sea bed, the traditional
right of sovereignty continued. However, modified bases for
acquisition of that right began to evolve, the most recent
expression of this trend being the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf. A close look at this development will
show those legal bases which have evolved.
Prescription can be readily rejected. No continental
-^Lauterpacht, op. cit




shelf proclamation was made by any nation prior to I9^5t the
term and concept itself being almost non-existent in the law
prior to that time. One need only refer to the Abu Dhabi
arbitration decision for confirmation of this. -) -)
Neither has the other previously discussed legal pre-
cept, occupation (or "effective occupation"), been the basis
on which title has been established. As some authors point
out, the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case
of the legal status of Eastern Greenland and the award in the
Clipperton Island Case ^ supports the proposition that full
effectiveness of occupation is not essential. Lauterpacht
goes even further stating that,
Actually these decisions demonstrate more than that.
They show that there are situations in which occupation
in the normal meaning of the word is not required
at all, and in whih the conception of occupation
is more or less a deceptive figure of speech. If this
is so with regard to inhabited or sparsely . inhabited
territory, it is particularly true in relation to
less inhabitable areas such as the sea bed and sub-
soil. 1 57
The International Law Commission put on record in its
first report to the General Assembly in 1950* its view that
the exercise of control and jurisdiction over the continental
158
shelf "was independent of the concept of occupation," This
-^Professor Dickenson commenting on the latter case in
1933. expressed the opinion that occupation is valueless in
determining ownership of such parts of the earth as still
remain unclaimed and unexploited. He included "the unex-
ploited lands that lie under the sea." AJIL, Vol. XXVII,
(1933), P. 133.
^Lauterpacht, op. cit
. , p. 423.
Ibid., p. 419. 1 5oThe Law of the Sea , p. 25.
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shelf proclamation was made by any nation prior to 19^5 » the
term and concept itself being almost non-existent in the law
prior to that time. One need only refer to the Abu Dhabi
arbitration decision for confirmation of this. -> ->
Neither has the other previously discussed legal pre-
cept, occupation (or "effective occupation"), been the basis
on which title has been established. As some authors point
out, the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case
of the legal status of Eastern Greenland and the award in the
Clipperton Island Case supports the proposition that full
effectiveness of occupation is not essential. Lauterpacht
goes even further stating that,
Actually these decisions demonstrate more than that,
They show that there are situations in which occupation
in the normal meaning of the word is not required
at all, and in whih the conception of occupation
is more or less a deceptive figure of speech. If this
is so with regard to inhabited or sparsely : inhabited
territory, it is particularly true in relation to
less inhabitable areas such as the sea bed and sub-
soil. I 57
The International Law Commission put on record in its
first report to the General Assembly in 1950, its view that
the exercise of control and jurisdiction over the continental
158
shelf "was independent of the concept of occupation, " This
-^Professor Dickenson commenting on the latter case in
1933 » expressed the opinion that occupation is valueless in
determining ownership of such parts of the earth as still
remain unclaimed and unexploited. He included "the unex-




Ibid., p. kl9. 1 ^8 The Law of the Sea , p. 25.
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view prevailed right up to final acceptance of the convention
in 1958. The convention neither refers to occupation nor
intimates in any way that it is a prerequisite to gaining
1 59title of the "submarine areas,"
The question has arisen as to whether ^proclamation"
of sovereignty may not be a new precept constituting that
action necessary to gain title to submarine areas because it
was 'solely by a series of "proclamations" that the contin-
ental shelves were appropriated, thereby establishing the
pattern of state practice which became the law. This, in the
writer's opinion, is an invalid assumption, for a pro-
clamation is only a means by which a title, claimed or ac-
quired, is announced. It is not a source of title or a means
of acquiring it. However, it is not unnecessary nor without
meaning. A state who makes a claim, regardless how valid,
must make that claim known by a formal pronouncement or
notification, particularly if it is a novel claim, one not
clearly defined in extent, or in possible conflict with other
states' claims. These proclamations then were nothing more
than declaratory, the title belonging to a state because of
some other legal basis.
Contiguity or continuity was clearly one of the prin-
ciples upon which title to the sea bed and subsoil was first
acquired. The early proclamations on the continental shelf
show it to be an essential requirement for the legitimization
159
From the text of the Truman Proclamation on the Con-
tinental Shelf, 19^5, Whiteman, op. cit . , p. 75^.
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of those claim. The United States spoke of the territory
claimed as
an extension of the land mass of the coastal nation
and thus naturally appertenant to it. A unity em-
phasized by the fact that these resources frequently
form a seaward extension or pool or a deposit lying
within the territory. "^
The Mexican Declaration was more specific,
As is well known, the lands which constitute contin-
ental masses do not as a rule rise steeply from the
• great ocean depths, but rest upon a submarine base
called the continental platform. This platform
obviously constitutes an integral part of the contin-
ental countries. ^61
The Argentine Declaration of 19^-6, began by reciting that the
submarine platform known also as the submarine plateau or
continental shelf, is closely united to the mainland both in
a morphological and geological unit with the continent. In
these early proclamations there were no additional criteria
on which states could base their claims to title other than
morphological and geological unity. Had this remained the
case, we would be required to say that this was the sole
legal basis. Moreover, it would be a legal basis which would,
by its nature, have no applicability to those areas that do
not form a morphological geological unity, that is the deep
sea bottom.
As the law developed and various concepts were studied,
Lauterpacht, op. cit
. , p. 424.
l6l Ibid., p. 426.
16?Because the continental shelves are chiefly unexplored




discussed, and codified; it became apparent that the previous
16?
strict application of contiguity was impractical and un-
164-
desirable. Therefore, it was rejected by the majority of
states. In its place was substituted the vague "adjacent
area," which bestowed title to the adjacent state regardless
of whether thera existed any "morphological and geological"
continental shelf. While still remotely related to the con-
cept of contiguity, there is considerable difference both in
degree of unity and ultimate extension. Under the strict
contiguity precept the right to title could be based on sub-
stantial, scientifically determinable facts, i.e. the geolo-
gical nature of the sea bed. Furthermore there existed a
positive boundary beyond which title could not be gained i.e.
the edge of the continental slope or shelf. These re-
strictions were removed when the more expansive, less de-
finable, principle of "adjacency" was adopted. Thus, without
such restrictions, "adjacency" is directly applicable to the
deep ocean bottom beyond the continental shelves, and states
can legally assert title to these lands using this principle.
More significant, hoitfever, is the fact that in the
codification of those principles on which a state bases the
163
Because some states had no continental shelf, but still
desired sovereignty over the adjacent sea bed.
164-
These factors have been developed from the theme
set forth by McDougal and Burke in Public Order of the Oceans
,
chapter 1, "Community Content and Fundamental Policies,"
p. 1-88, and "Legal Aspects of Ocean Exploration Status and
Outlook," a paper presented at the first general session,
MTS Convention, June I966.
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exercise of its sovereign rights over the adjacent submarine
areas exploitation, a new method of acquiring title became
accepted. In the writer 1 s view, this is a unique and inde-
pendent principle; it is neither contiguity, prescription,
proclamation, conquest, treaty, accretion, nor occupation.
Furthermore, it does not require previous occurrence or
existence of one of the above for effect. Exploitation, in
the words of the convention, is not in a subordinate position
to "adjacency." Rather the opposite is true. The sea bottom
is not considered adjacent, thereby coming under the sover-
eign control of a state, until exploitation has occurred.
Since exploitation can occur anywhere, at any depth, and is
in no way limited by the convention, it becomes a second
legally acceptable principle by which state sovereignty can be
extended to the sea bed and subsoil. It is directly appli-
cable to the deep sea bottom.
Common Good •
We have seen, in this analysis of the development of
law for the deep sea resources, several related factors.
First, because of the requirements of the exploitive industry
single state sovereign control is both needed and to be ex-
pected. Secondly, we saw that the other uses to which the
ocean may be put will support rather than abate such a trend.
Thirdly, in looking at the principles of the law, we found
that the principle of "freedom of the seas," which might
stand in the way of such a trend toward sovereignty was in-
applicable to the sea bottom and, consequently, state
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practice has ignored it in that area. Finally, when examining
the only existent law which addresses itself to the sea bot-
tom albeit not specifically to the deep sea, we saw that the
right to acquire title was upheld and that this title was
based on either adjacency, exploitation, or both. These pre-
cepts are applicable to any and every portion of all the
oceans. Thus states should, can, and will calira sovereign
rights over the deep sea resources.
One can not leave the development of the law here, for
without restraint, unencumbered exercise of sovereignty would
assuredly result in abuses detrimental to the common good of
nations. The law must go further and create a framework
based on reason and justice within which states may operate.
Degrees of utilization and authority should be established
in order that a particular claim could be considered lawful
in the light of all relevant factors. Several such factors
165
are discussed as follows:
First, the objectives sought by the state claiming
title should have major if not determinative bearing on the
permissibility of acquisitions. Many organizations including
nations, private associations, and individuals may share
certain objectives which may be pursued by unilateral claim
to submarine areas. An example would be an undersea
Expression of the opposite legal positions, supporting
each of these views may be found in the books by Garcia
Amador of Cuba, The Exploitation and Conservation of the
Resources of the Sea
,
and by Shigeru Oda, International Con-
trol of Sea Resources.
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laboratory or oceanographic research facility. The benefit
from such use does not pertain exculsively to the claimant
state, but to mankind in general. For this reason, the de-
gree of exclusiveness or inclusiveness of the specific ob-
jectives should be carefully weighed in assessing the reason-
ableness of a claim.
Secondly, specific selection of sites could be in-
fluenced by the remoteness of a region from conflicting uses,
and by the relative proximity of various submarine regions
to the territory of the claimant state. Since there is such
a wide range of possible sites, selection of a location which
is widely separated from particular non-claimant states might
be considered important. Another factor relevant to the
legality of a claim might be the degree of provocation im-
plied in the selection of a site adjacent to another state.
Thirdly, the extent of the area concerned would, of
course, be a major factor to be considered. Claims to small
surface areas might be looked on more favorably than a claim
to a very large part of the ocean floor, especially if super-
jacent water uses were wholly or partially curtailed thereby.
Fourthly, a claim may vary a great deal in terms of
its duration, from an assertion of permanent authority to one
of control for only a matter of days or weeks. In the early
stages of ocean exploitation, states probably will not favor
claims of indefinite duration for they could entail unde-
sirable interference with uses presently unforeseen. However,
when all other factors are taken into consideration, even
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permanent claims may be adjudged reasonable.
The last factor of prime importance is the kind and
degree of interference with other states explicitly or im-
plicity demanded by a particular claim. Claims to exclusive
control which will displace only hypothetical usages will
cause fewer difficulties than those which involve actual
interference. The greater the infringement on other pro-
ductive activities, the greater the task of the claimant
state to justify the reasonableness of its claim. One of the
reasons for concluding that it is lawful to acquire regions
of the ocean floor is that little interference with the other
uses of the ocean is likely to occur.
These factors must be applied to claims on an individ-
ual basis. However, it is difficult if not impossible to
formulate anything but abstract generalizations in the ab-
sence of concrete claims. In the face of such impending
activity as sea mount settlement, mineral dredging, and oil
drilling a great need exists for discussion and examination
of factors in order to provide for orderly progress. In con-
clusion, it must be re-emphasized that there is great benefit
to be gained from the ocean floor and that states are begin-
ning to awaken to the existence of these gains. The law must
similarly awaken to the reality of this situation. It must
turn away from the futile discussion of legality or illegal-
ity of sovereignty per se over the sea bed to the vitally
important examination of methods and criteria for the just
and reasonable acquisition of title.

PART III
THE REGIME FOR EXPLOITATION OF SEA RESOURCES -
MEETING THE CHALLENGE
In recent years, the law of the sea has received more
international attention than any other area of international
law. However, it has been shown in Parts I and II how, after
many years of discussion, two major international conventions,
and a host of regional conferences, the law governing the
exploitation of resources of the sea, the continental shelf,
and the deep sea bottom remains ambiguous, contradictory, or
virtually non-existent. In general the reaction of legal
observers has been to criticize the shortsightedness of the
delegates to the Geneva Conference. The most frequently
mentioned remedy is to hold another Geneva Conference in
the immediate future to clarify the situation. Before ar-
riving at such a conclusion, however, one should attempt to
discover what reasons lie behind the failure of the law in
these specific areas. Once these obstacles have been iden-
tified and examined, one may find a more effective strategy
with which to approach improvement in the law.

CHAPTER VIII
POLITICAL OBSTACLES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE LAW
The complex relationship between laxv and politics, in
general, is too lengthy a subject for discussion here. Suf-
fice it to say that political considerations have always
played a role in the development of the law, end nations 1 views
on the content and utility of international law have been
similarly influenced by political interests. A barrier to
the development and codification of the law is raised when
nations have conflicting politically influenced objectives
for the law which can not be resolved. Such an impasse is
re-enforced as the importance of the political objectives
and degree of political influence increases, until a point
is reached either where no consensus at all can be achieved
or where the law which does result is a meaningless or con-
tradictory compromise. Such a situation nearly existed dur-
ing the two conferences held at Geneva in 1958, and i960.
Examination of the politically toned points of conflict which
occurred shows how their irresolution affected the formu-
lation of the la 7 :. These differences did not disappear at
the close of the conference. They stand today as the major
obstacles in the path of the achievement of consensus.
The particular developments at Geneva demonstrate an
interesting paradox in the attitudes of states. Nations
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recognize extreme sovereignty as a barrier to the maintenance
of peace and the expansion of international co-operation, yet,
in the realm of the sea they are extending their sovereignty
in a bold and positive manner. The power of national self-
interest is, of course, the most significant single explan-
atory factor for this. Poor coastal states claim vast areas
with unlimited sovereignty, hoping thereby to better their
lot. Nations such as Japan support a rigid notion of freedom
of the seas to permit effective and far-reaching fishing
1 66fleets a maximum advantage. The United States, with its
advanced technology and strong Navy, will claim more and more
undersea territory as it becomes commercially advantageous.
The sea is an easy mark for the nation with a "something for
nothing" attitude.
Negotiations at Geneva
From the first the states at Geneva split themselves
into groups based on political attitudes rather than on com-
mon legal heritage or international law tradition. A division
occurred in which "have not" states were generally aligned
against the "haves." The dissatisfied "have not" faction
was composed of states that are associated in the United
Nations with either the Asian-African, Arab, and Latin American
caucusing groups or with the anti-colonial common interest
group. These constituted fifty-four of the eighty-six states
1 66




represented at the first conference and fifty-six of the
eighty-eight at the second. The second faction included all
those states present that had a Western European tradition.
The twenty-three states in this group came from the Western
European, Benelux, European Community, and Scandanavian cau-
cusing groups and the NATO common interest group. Usually
voting with them were the "white commonwealth" states, five
European states not represented in the General Assembly,
Israel, and the five United States cold war allies - Japan,
Pakistan, and the Republics of China, Korea, and Vietnam.
The lines of conflict were drawn early over the role
that politics was to play in the development of the law. The
dissatisfied states viewed the conduct of the conference it-
self as political in nature. They used methods such as bloc
organization, bloc voting, bloc sponsored proposals, bloc
sponsored candidates for the elective offices of the confer-
ence, and bloc attempts to manipulate the rules of procedure.
The dissatisfied states also acted on the assumption that the
subject to be dealt with in the conference was to be political.
Frequent reference was made to the General Assembly resol-
ution that stated, "(the conference) should take into account
not only the legal but also the technical, biological, econo-
16?
mic, and political aspects of the problem." It is evident
from the statements and actions of the dissatisfied states
that they took this to mean that they had liberty to fight




for their own best interests.
A statement by the Vietnamese delegate, Mr. Buukinh,
in a debate on the continental shelf clearly demonstrates
this attitude. He stated that his "delegation would prefer
to see the criterion of depth alone retained particularly as
the waters off its own shores were relatively shallow and
did not reach a depth of 200 meters for more than 200 miles."
In discussing a Canadian proposal on reservations to any
convention signed as a result of the conference, Mr. Gomez
Robledo^ the Mexican delegate, said*
Representatives wishing to permit reservations had
been reproached for defending national interests;
but they were attending the conference for that
very purpose. 1°9
Mr. Caabasi, the Lybian delegate, discussing a United States
proposal on the breadth of the territorial sea, remarked that
his delegation "had voted against the United States proposal
because it contained provisions which were contrary to his
country's interests."
A brief examination of the history of the United States
proposal at the second conference for a six mile territorial
sea and an additional six mile fishing zone clearly illus-
trates the political climate and its detrimental effect on
the orderly development of a regime for the exploitation of




, 14th Plenary Meeting, par. 66.
J-7°This account was given the writer by the Hon. Arthur
H. Dean on June 28, I966.
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sea resources. At the conference, the diplomatic forces of
the United States and the Soviet Union were strongly opposed.
The United States, because of her naval and merchant commit-
ments and power, was against an extension of the territorial
sea to twelve miles. Such an extension would jeopardize free
passage through 116 critical straits and passages. The Sov-
iets, on the other hand, wanted the twelve mile limit but
realized few nations would agree. However, Russia felt that
if she were to prevent the United States and its allies from
achieving agreement to a three mile limit for the territorial
sea she could establish the framework which might permit the
establishment of a twelve mile limit at a later date. At all
times it was desperately uncertain as to whether the United
States could obtain a two-thirds vote for a territorial sea
of less than twelve miles, or whether Russia and its allies
could obtain a blocking third of the votes and prevent agree-
ment.
In her straggle for votes, the United States compromised
until she was prepared to accept a six plus six formula (in-
cidentally, blocking fifty- two international straits). After
weeks of difficult negotiation just enough support was gained
to guarantee adoption. On the night before the day of the
voting the status changed. As the United States represent-
ative, Hon. Arthur Dean, recounts it the delegate from
Ecuador, who had agreed to vote for the resolution, came to
see him and stated that he could not vote for the resolution
unless certain United States private monetary claims against
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the Ecuador Government were dropped. Mr. Dean had no power to
oblige his request. The following day, Ecuador and her bloc,
Peru and Chile, which had previously agreed to support the
six plus six formula voted against it. The formula was de-
feated by one vote. The effect of this political situation
is obvious. A clearly delineated area for the establishment
of a fishing zone remains undetermined today, opening the way
for a variety of different conflicting national claims to ex-
171&lusive fishing rights. '
A second major area of conflict between the satisfied
and dissatisfied nations was the role that law was to play in
the development of political interests. As Dr. Jorge Castaneda
of Mexico pointed out?
Rigid adherence to the traditional rules of inter-
national law could prove disastrous to all concerned,
for the traditional rules on the regime of the sea
had been created by the great powers for their own
purposes before many major problems had arisen and
before the birth of the new states which now form
the majority. 1 7
2
This theme vans throughout the speeches by delegates of many
dissatisfied states; for example, Mr. Ba Han of Burma:
In the past, international law had been a body of
rules and usages adopted by powerful states. How-
ever, the international situation had changed and new
sovereign independent states had emerged, keenly
conscious of their liberty. '3
1 ?lUnited Nations Conference , A/Conf. 13/41, 13th Meeting,
par. 25.
1 72ibid. , 4th Meeting, par. 6.
l7 3lbid., 5th Meeting, par. 13.
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Mr. Ulloa Sotomayor of Peru;
Rules of international law had sometimes been uni-
laterally created in the interests of Great Powers,
it was therefore reasonable for certain rules of
law to be initiated by small states in their leg-
itimate interests .... It was inadmissible that a
sort of colonialism of the high seas should. b<
allowed in the name of freedom of the seas
Mr. Diallo of Guinea;
17
With regard to "historic rights"
. . .
; the concept
was nothing other than a manifestation of the
rights of the strongest and a vestige of colon-
ialism which (Guinea) would oppose in all its ."
forms. To perpetuate these rights would be a grave
injustice to the young states that were struggling
not only for political but also for economic inde-
pendence. ^75
In fact, the dissatisfied states denied the entire history
and body of international law. The statement of Mr. Melo
Lecaros of Chile is typical;
The rise and development of the law of the sea had
been prompted by one single factor: interest. Pol-
itical or economic interest had always prevailed in
defining the law of the sea through the centuries.
Grotius had not argued for the freedom of the seas
simply as an intellectual concept, but to defend
the interests of the Dutch East India Company. Sel-
dom s sole aim in refuting Grotius had been to
defend England's interest. Things had changed very
greatly since that time. The rule of law had been
extended, but it was impossible to overlook the
fact that the reason for the law was interest. ^76
Furthermore, the dissatisfied states did not consider that
any law created before their independence was binding upon
them. Mr. Bocobo of the Phillippines commented that "the
17^
' United Nations Conference , A/Conf. 19/8, 18th Meeting,
6.
175Ibid. , 14th Meeting, par. 13-14.
1?6A/Conf. 13/39, 50th Meeting, par. 1.
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newer countries valued their freedom above all else and re-
fused to accept certain rules of international law evolved
177before they had attained statehood." Similarly, Mr. Loutfi
of the United Arab Republic remarked, that*
the majority of the new countries that have gained
their independence since (the Hague Conference of
1930) have adopted a limit in excess of three miles.
The arguement that the three mile rule constituted
a principle of international law was thus devoid
of substance. l?o
And Mr. Ba Han of Burma said that he:
.... could not accept the suggestion that abandon-
ment of the three mile rule was a concession. That
alleged rule had been established by others at a time
when Burma, for one, was completely helpless under
foreign rule.^79
The keynote was change for the sake of change and re-
jection per se of any notion of common interest with the sat-
isfied states who formulated the law. Equivalency was drawn
between international law and the law used to impose foreign
rule. The words of Mr. Quarshic of Ghana clearly bring this
out ,:
The African states which had seen their continent
divided among the great powers without the consent
of the populations concerned, found it difficult to
understand the moral arguments now advanced against
the division of the sea. 1 "
The dissatisfied states used "doctrine" and "principle,"
not as a basis for consistent legal philosophy but
"^United Nations Conference, A/Conf. 13/39. 21st Meeting,
par. k.
l78A/Conf. 13/38, 1^-th Plenary Meeting, par. 51.
'°Ibid. , 21st Plenary Meeting, par. 21.
*"°Robert L. Fridham, "Negotiating International Law,"
a Case Study, World Politics, Vol. 18, October, I965, p. 29.
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opportunistically to gain their own political and economic
ends. The result was absurd inconsistencies In their position
1 81
on sovereignty. As Mr. Robert Friedham points out, they
were concerned with the preservation of their own sover-
eignty even at the risk of impinging upon the rights of other
states. Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ghana, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal,
Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic,
all ardent supporters of an absolute theory of state sover-
eignty, were able to introduce, without a qualm, a proposal
that would give a landlocked state an absolute right of tran-
sit across the territory of a coastal state, thereby possibly
impairing the sovereignty of the latter. India, a leading
advocate of the sovereignty of the coastal state over its
continental shelf, making no attempt to explain away the
seeming inconsistency of her position, introduced a proposal
that would prevent the "sovereign" coastal state from building
military bases or installations on the continental shelf.
Thus sovereignty was not treated as- a juridical idea to be
developed so that the same legal rules would apply to all
states equally. Instead, it was appropriated by the dis-
satisfied as a means of maintaining tactical freedom.
There are several corollary characteristics of this
attitude which made communication with the more legally
oriented states difficult and which had an unsettling effect
on the development of the law of the sea as it affects




exploitation of resources. The dissatisfied states displayed
great distrust of the "expert." He was associated with the
colonial powers and the West and, therefore, was feared and
resented. Mr. Quarshic of Ghana typified this attitude when
he said thatj
Ghana feared the exploitation of its fishing resources
and threats to its security; it sought a solution
which would guarantee it a maximum freedom from ex-
ploitation and threats. Its fears could not be allay-
ed by exhibitions of technical knowledge or outright
dismissal of its views. In consultation, the main
point often lay less in the validity of the argument
itself than in the reaction to that argument.
There was also a reluctance on the part of the dissatisfied
states to commit themselves to legal details on the exercise
of rights and duties. Such legal formality was considered
suspect; vague general statements were preferred. As a re-
sult, many provisions sponsored by and embodied in the con-
vention served only to accentuate the disagreements. "3
The dissatisfied states were not alone in their short-
sightedness and faulty perception. The satisfied states were
unable to convince the dissatisified nations that measures
under discussion protected their interests as well as those of
the satisfied states. Furthermore, in many cases the satis-
fied states acted as if they did not understand that the
political process by which substantial questions are negot-
iated can in itself often greatly influence the results. Too
1 2United Nations Conference , A/Conf. 19/1, 25th Meeting,
par. 22.




often they would not concede any necessary relationship
between law and politics. Professor Paul de la Pradelle, the
Monacan delegate said in this regard, "It was difficult but
necessary to disentangle the law of the sea from the ac-
1 RU
cretions imposed by national sovereignty." The satisfied
states were bound by a rather inflexible legalism which im-
peded progress. For example, Mr. Sture Petren, the Swedish
delegate, emphasized*
the difference between the "progressive development"
of international law and its "codification." In
practice, the development of. law and its codification
could not easily be separated
. . . Any conventions
which might be drafted by the conference whether
they related to the codification or the development
of the law, would therefore be of a mixed nature,
containing both old rules of law and new ones. These
two kinds of law had not at all the same legal effect.
The old rules if they were based on customary law,
bound all mankind independently of the new conventions
to be concluded, whereas the new rules, which would
come into being only through the conventions, would
bind only those states which signed and ratified those
conventions. Other states would not be bound to re-
cognize or observe them. The Swedish delegation there-
fore felt that the Conference whould proceed with
caution, and should not depart too radically from
existing law. °->
Dr. Max Sorensen of Denmark felt that:
.... a trend which weakened rather than strengthened
the authority of the international law of the sea
should be halted, and Denmark would co-operate whole
heartedly with other nations in restoring the auth-
ority of the law.l°6
Often the more legally oriented states became bogged down in
l8\fnited Nations Conference , A/Conf. 19/8, 23rd Meeting,
par. 1?.
<A/Conf. 13/39, 6th Meeting, par. 1-2 as well as par.
2^-25 and 18th Meeting, par. 10.
186Ibid. , 4th Meeting, par. 10.
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intricate legal proposals, debating the fine points of a word
or phrase, or re-arguing past case precedents and writings.
This, combined with the tendency to ignore charges that the
law was only an expression of their national interest, did
nothing to allay the fears and suspicions of the recently
initiated states.
Political Reality and Future Conventions
The conclusion from the above analysis is that if this
attitude continues there is serious doubt as to the ability of
another sea convention in the near future to accomplish any-
thing useful. We must act on the assumption that the pressures
and demands of the dissatisfied states, though not completely
acceded to, must be acknowledged, and that politics be alloi-jed
to play a more significant role. Faced with this reality,
and before convening another convention, we must develop an
approach to the political problem which is based on lessons
learned from the preceeding conferences. W.R. Chapman, an
advisor to the United States delegation to both conferences,
has pointed out some of these lessens.
1) Do not attempt to open up for modification any
aspect of the law of the sea without a careful study and es-
timation of what other aspects will be opened up at the same
time based on the interests and viex^s of all other inde-
pendent sovereign nations, whether friend or foe.
2) Having ascertained as well as possible what other
'W.R. Chapman, testimony before House Subcommittee on
Oceanography (Hearings N.O.P.L.,.), pp. 338-^07.
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aspects will be opened up, .ao not get involved in any inter-
national conference on any aspect of the subject until all
aspects which may be opened up have been examined from the
standpoint not only of what will be gained from a favorable
vote, but what will be lost from an unfavorable one, and also
of what compromise may be necessary during the course of ne-
gotiations.
In order to win a vote and an issue in a United Nations
Conference it is necessary to get a two-thirds majority vote .
of those present and voting. On several quite important
issues in all four of the conventions of 1958 » the United
States was required to modify its desired position mater-
ially in order to line up enough votes to avoid losing the
issue,
3) Only after these evaluations are made is it pos-
sible to decide whether or not the United States wishes to
re-open the law of the sea controversy or whether it is not
best to approach the problem from a different angle. In
either case legal, technological, scientific, political, and
diplomatic spadework must be done in depth and detail.

CHAPTER IX
A PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS
It may well be concluded from the political realities
presented in the previous chapter that an international con-
ference is not the immediate answer to the pressing problems
in the international lav; of ocean exploitation. A more pro-
fitable and necessary alternative is available with which to
effect real progress. If properly organized and directed, a
domestic program can be utilized to accomplish the sorely
needed legal, technological, scientific, political, and dip-
lomatic spadework mentioned above. Let us look at what steps
have been taken in this direction and what further action is
necessary.
Public Law ^54
On June 17, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed
into law Senate Bill 9^» taking what is one of the most
potentially significant steps since the Truman Proclamation
on the Continental Shelf in 19^5 • Entitled the "Marine Resour-
ces and Development Act of I966," this legislation was the
culmination of eighteen months of exhaustive study, hearings,
and testimony by practically every prominent scientist,
military officer, technician, industrialist, legislator and
1 RR
public servant in the field of oceanography. Its/policy
^"Testimony of prominent international lawyers was con-
spicuous in its absence.
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and objectives are quoted as follows:
(a) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
United States to develop, encourage, and maintain a
co-ordinated, comprehensive, and long range national
program in marine science for the benefit of mankind
to assist in protection of health and property, en-
hancement of commerce, transportation, and national
security, rehabilitation of our commercial fisheries,
and increased utilization of these and other resources.
(b) The marine science activities of the United States




The accelerated development of the resources
of the marine environment.
2) The expansion of human knowledge of the marine
environment.
3) The encouragement of private investment enter-
prise in exploration, technological development, mar-
ine commerce, and economic utilization of the re-
sources of the marine environment.
*0 The preservation of the role of the United
States as a leader in marine science and resource de-
velopment.
5) The advancement of education and training in
marine science.
6) The development and improvement of the cap-
abilities, performance, use, and efficiency of vehicles,
equipment, and instruments for use in exploration,
research surveys, the recovery of resources, and the
transmission of energy in the marine environment.
7) The effective utilization of the scientific
and engineering resources of the nations, with close
co-operation among all interested agencies, public
and private, in orde,r to avoid unnecessary duplication
of effort, facilities, and equipment or waste. °°
The Act provides for a council and a commission to
implement these policies. Within eighteen months of formation,
the commission is to make an extensive comprehensive report
to the council and then be dissolved. The council is then to
give advice and assistance to the President. For the
°89th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives,
Report no. 15^8, "Marine Resources and Engineering Develop-
ment Act of i960," Section II.
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purposes of this discussion, we must focus our attention on
Section IV, subsection 5* of the bill which holds the key to
the necessary legal "program for progress." It states:-
(The Council) will undertake a comprehensive study,
by contract or otherwise, of the legal problems arising
out of the management,, use, development, recovery, 300
and control of the resources of the marine environment.
In the writer's opinion, for meaningful implementation of
this farsighted provision, a "program in ocean resource law"
should be initiated and pursued along the following lines:
The Program
The main purpose for implementing this program would
be to provide a forum to utilize the top legal scholars,
lawyers, scientists, businessmen, and national and inter-
national organizations (public and private) to carry on a
continuing research analysis and discussion of the interface
of the technological, economic, and scientific with the legal
aspects of ocean space" use. Apart from individual projects,
special task forces could be assigned to given problem areas.
Through these task forces the program would be in a position
to undertake rapidly and competently specific legal studies
on request and to correlate and draw up recommendations
190y The history behind this provision is of interest here.
The Marine Resources Act of i960, was an amalgamation of
approximately 16 other bills one of which (H.R. 5175) stated
"that the United States Coast Guard is authorized and dir-
ected to conduct by contract or otherwise, a study of the
legal problems arising out of the management, use, and
control of the natural resources of the oceans and ocean
beds." $50,000 would have been authorized for the study.
The Coast Guard was considered an inappropriate sponsor for
such study and H.R. 5175 was denied individual status.
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wherever desirable. The program would also serve as a medium
for preparation and publication of texts, papers, teaching
materials, and symposia. The specific activities the program
would undertake are listed as follows:
1. Co-ordination . Co-ordination between the legal
field and the scientific, political, and industrial fields is
necessary in order to provide the former with guidelines and
information, and the latter with sound advice and principle.
This is, perhaps, the single most necessary prerequisite for
sound legal development The areas in particular need of
co-ordination include the following:
a) Political. There is great need in the legis-
lative branch of the government for sound international legal
advice. Congress works in a near vacuum, receiving what
legal opinion it does from either State Department briefs or
191testimony from interested commercial parties. On the
other hand, the government must provide lawyers with an over-
192
all "political theory" for the oceans. 7 National policy not
legal opinion is required to insure security and the desire
to promote international social welfare in developing the
ocean for the common use of mankind. Who shall use the re-
sources and under what constraints? The pressures generated
1°1
* Testimony of prominent international lawyers was
conspicuous in its absence.
192
Mr. James W. Oswald of the Underseas Division,
Westinghouse Electric Corp. , admirably delineated this pro-
blem in his paper, "Toward a Political Theory of the Ocean,"
Transactions MTS Convention, June 1966, p. 358-72.
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by the present international coalitions, the nature of nuclear
weapons, the competition between and among military and in-
dustrial users, and the nature and knowledge of the environ-
ment itself make this a difficult question. The answer lies
in the establishment of a balance which will prevent the new
environment from becoming a sphere of ruthless competition.
On a national, as well as an international level, gov-
ernments must co-operate to develop a healthy legal environ-
ment. For example, our Submerged Lands Act and Cuter Con-
tinental Shelves Land Act divide the responsibility for es-
tablishment of law between the states and the Federal Govern-
ment. Thus, we have fifty-one different bodies of law gover-
ning the exploitation of diverse portions of the ocean bottom.
In addition, under Federal law, the discoverer of a mineral
deposit in the continental shelf has no preferential rights
to its exploitation. The lease will go to the highest bidder;
a rule hardly conducive to exploitation.
b) Scientific. Specific information in the scientific
fields is vital to the development of the law. The knowledge
of the feeding, migration, and reproduction habits of ex-
ploitable fisheries stocks is absolutely necessary before it
can be determined that a certain type or location of fishing
is depleting the fish population. The point of maximum yield
must be scientifically determinable before any realistic or
just conservation law can be either accepted or enforced.
Providing this raw data to the lawyer is not sufficient
to establish a suitable fishing regime. Economic studies
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must be made available for consideration. If such factors
are ignored a conservation law may be detrimental both to the
industry as a whole and to the individual fishermen, as has
193
occurred in the Pacific Halibut Fishery 7J though that pro-
gram has been successful in conserving the fish. The signi-
ficant economic problem of the allocation of higher yields
still remains.
Before there can be full development of the law for
exploitation of minerals, mineral deposits must be assayed
and located, capabilities of the bottom to support exploit-
ation and occupation must be evaluated, and sea bed topo-
graphy must be known for delimitation of natural boundaries
and areas of mutual interest. Typical of the scope of in-
vestigation required is that conducted by Battelle Memorial
Institute in 1965. This study, commissioned by the Commerce
Department, had as its objectives, to identify the economic
benefits that can be derived from the present and future sur-
vey activities in the continental shelf region and to delin-
eate present and future geographical regions of commercial
interest in the continental shelf region. This comprehensive
oceanographic project included hydrographic surveys, bio-
logical oceanography, geophysical research, physical and
"-'The plea for greater economic and social studies of
the effects and necessity of conservation prior to imple-
mentation is perhaps one of the most significant observations
made by HcDougal and Burke in Public Order of the Oceans
.
For comment and documentation see particularly "Claims to




chemical oceanography, and programs in geomagnetism, seis-
mology, geodesy, hydrography, and aeronautical charting.
c) Industrial. In order for the lawyer to meet the
needs of industry, he must understand the processes industry
is using or planning to use in exploitation. Is the mining
industry developing a bottom emplanted device, or will it be
mobile; how large an area does a petroleum company need for
a "set" of well heads, what type of pipelines will they use,
and how much pollution or interference will they generate?
The detrimental effect of the extended fishing zone on the
American tuna industry is an example of the problems that can
arise when the law is formed without close co-ordination with
the industry concerned. To effectively fish the tuna re-
sources of the Eastern Tropical Pacific, the fishermen must
be able to scout for and follow the migrating movements of the
tuna. Closure of the seas seriously hampers this mobile
international industry. Furthermore, with the present equip-
ment there is little difficulty in determining whether the
tuna boats are within three miles of the shore, but consider-
able navigational difficulties will arise in determining
whether the distance is twelve miles or more. In addition,
most of the vessels are purse seiners and become practically
immobilized after setting their nets; since most tides and
i ok7 See the letter from U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey to
Battelle Memorial Institute dated April 12, I965, in which




currents drift toward shore, the real limit imposed on the
fishermen is far greater than that defined legally. The
United States extension of the fishing zone to twelve miles
not only re-enforces the extensive Latin American claims
thereby restricting tuna operations (six boats were captured
on the high seas in I966) but also reduces the compensation
offered to tuna fishermen. The government will not pay fin-
es levied within an area similar to that which the United
States claims. In this regard the general manager of the
American Tunaboat Association stated that:
the net effect will be to deny United States tuna
vessels access to tuna grounds for searching and cat-
ching purposes. The loss resulting to the fleet
will not be mortal, but it will be severe in that
the fleets ability to compete with foreign com-
petition will be seriously affected. 95
2. Studies in ocean space law . Although closely re-
lated to co-ordination, this involves specific studies in that
area of the law- which governs relationships arising out of,
196
or relating to, the use of ocean space. Within this broad
framework a continuous activity of the program would be to
determine and clarify the present and expected scope and field
of ocean space law, such as;
195Statement of August Filando (Hearings M.F.L.), pp. 3^-2-
319.
196
' From unpublished papers and remarks given the writer by
Professor William L. Griffin as well as exerpts from an ex-
perimental mimeographed edition of "Text, Treaties, Cases,
and Other Materials on the Law of the Ocean Space," which
Professor Griffin is using in an experimental course at
Temple University School of Law.
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Surveys of the present state of the law, adopted or es-
tablished on the local, national, and international levels by
legislation, treaties
s
court decisions, and commercial prac-
tices.
Surveys to identify the manner in which the expansion
and development of new commercial uses of ocean space is, or
is likely to be, influenced by the present legal position;
with special emphasis on identification of the inhibitions to
such commercial uses which may be rooted in the present legal
position and could be removed by a change in, or clarification
of, the present legal position.
Studies of where and how to draw the lines of recon-
ciliation among competing uses of ocean space, especially the
reconciliation of new uses of the sea and sea bed with exist-
ing uses and employment of new techniques without undue de-
rangement of other interests.
Review and evaluation of proposals for changes in, or
for new, laws and treaties which have been advanced by in-
dividuals or organizations, both governmental and non-govern-
mental.
3. Educational activities. As has been seen, many
different fields of specialization are combined in ocean ex-
ploitation activity. Everyone who is, or will become in-
volved, regardless of his particular area of interest will
find that his professional participation will be enhanced by
knowledge of the expanding legal framework and its rational
adaptation to new facts and situations brought about by
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technological and commercial advances and achievements in
ocean space. Therefore, the "program in ocean resource law"
should undertake and promote a variety of educational pro-
grams
.
4. Public activities . The proposed program would dis-
seminate through publication wherever possible and desirable
texts, symposia, lectures and results of studies it under-
takes or promotes. Such publication is needed and of great
value today.
This admittedly energetic program of co-operation,
study, education, publication and dissemination is necessary
to properly implement the provision of P.L. 45^. In so doing
the United States will establish the M program for progress"
which can build a sound domestic basis for international legal




Only one conclusion can be drawn from a serious study
of the various aspects of oceanology. The seas of the world
have potentials which stagger even the most skeptical imagin-
ation. Equally significant is the fact that man is actively
engaged in perfecting the means with which to realize that
potential. Within the nature of this exploitive process,
however, lies the seeds of conflict, dispute, and possible
destruction of those resources now so abundant and so neces-
sary for the future. The law and those responsible for its
development must awaken to the technical and scientific
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reality of currenb achievements and adapt the law of nations
to adequately regulate ocean exploitation for the benefit of
all mankind. This is no easy task, for the world political
situation raises considerable barriers to the orderly deter-
mination of what is the common good and what is in the common
interest. We can not wait complacently for these obstacles
to djte appear, nor can we ignore them and proceed blindly in
the international sphere for the harm done may be great and
the damage permanent. The answer lies in the effective,
vigorous, domestic legal program for the development of inter-
national and national law worked out in conjunction with the
scientific, technological, political, and industrial discip-
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LETTER FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
Department of State
Washington, May 3, 1965
Hon. Herbert C. Bonner
Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
House of Representatives.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Your letter of February 23. 1965.
previously acknowledged, requested the views of the Depart-
ment of State on H.R. 5^-7 5t a bill providing for a study of
the legal problems of management, use, and control of the
natural resources of the oceans and ocean beds.
While the Department is unaware of the need for any
such legal study from the standpoint of international law or
of our relations with foreign countries it sees no objection
thereto if such a study is considered necessary from a dom-
estic law standpoint. In such eventuality some agency of
the Government having responsibilities in the field of our
natural resources, such as the Department of the Interior,
might be more appropriate for this function than the U.S.
Coast Guard.
The Bureau of the Budget advises that from the stand-
point of the administration^ program there is no objection
to the submission of this report.
Sincerely yours,
Douglas MacArthur II
Assistant Secretary for Congressionsl Relations





MEMORANDUM FROM ASSOCIATE SOLICITER
DIVISION OF PUBLIC LANDS
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR




TO: Director, Bureau of Land Management
FROM: Associate Solicitor, Division of Public Lands
SUBJECT: Application of Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to
designated area off the coast of California
This is in reply to your memorandum of April 13t 1961, in-
quiring whether phosphate deposits in a designated area off
the coast of southern California may be leased under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (67 Stat. 462; 43 U.S.C.
sees. 1331-1343).
The designated area lies some forty miles off the coast of
southern California. While it lies closer to the mainland
than San Clemente Island, the designated area does not lie
between that island and the mainland but rather in the open
sea. The soundings in the designated area range between 43
and 670 fathoms, the greater part of the area being at a
depth of far more than 100 fathoms. Between the designated
area and the mainland lies a deep channel in which the
soundings are of 600 fathoms and more.
The question of the propriety of leasing phosphate deposits
in this area under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act has
been presented to us because it has been frequently said in
the past that the continental shelf extends seaifard to a
point where the water deepens rapidly and that this outer
limit is set at the 100-fathom line. Under such a defini-
tion the designated area would lie beyond the outer
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Continental Shelf, and, consequently, the crux of this pro-
blem is whether there is in fact a seaward limit to the ap-
plicability of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act set at
the 100- fathom line. The distance of 40 miles from the main-
land is of little importance since in the Gulf of Mexico
activities under the Act are conducted at a greater distance;
there, however, the depth of the water increases very slowly.
The question presented is rather novel. Previous questions
as to the applicability of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act have concerned the landward limits of the outer Contin-
ental Shelf and the disputes between the States and the
Federal Government as to boundaries. The question here is
not similar because there is no other party to assert Juris-
diction over the seabed and subsoil of this area if the
United States should fall to do so.
The definition of the "Outer Continental Shelf" in section
2(a) of the Act (43 U.S.C., sec. 1331(a)) is silent as to
how far in a seaward direction the continental shelf extends.
The definition merely states:
"(a) The term * outer Continental Shelf 1 means all
submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area
of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in sec-
tion 2 of the Submerged Lands Act (Public Law 31,
Eighty-third Congress, first session), and of which
the stibsoll and seabed appertain to the United States
and are subject to its Jurisdiction and control."
It should be noted that section 2(a) defines the shelf in
terms of the subsoil and seabed under the jurisdiction and
control of the United States, while section 3(a) (43 U.S.C.
sec. 1332(a)) declares that the subsoil and seabed of the
"outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States
and are subject to its jurisdiction, control and power of
disposition***." Thus the term "outer Continental Shelf"
appears to be used in the Act not as a geographic term
generally understood by geographers but as having been
given a special statutory definition in order that it may
apply to all submerged lands over which the United
States has asserted jurisdiction and control seaward of
the boundaries of the States.
While the statute is silent as to the seaward limits of the
continental shelf, the legislative history is vague. It,
unlike the statute, does contain a description of the con-
tinental shelf as it is regarded by geographers. However,
as we have pointed out above, the statute does not employ
the term as it is ordinarily used by geographers, but em-
ploys it rather as describing all the submerged lands sea-
ward of the States* boundaries over which the United States
asserts jurisdiction and control. Consequently, any
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description in the legislative history of the continental shelf
as a geographic concept may be regarded as an effort to give
the Congress a general idea of the area over which the United
States was asserting jurisdiction rather than a precise de-
finition applicable to the statute. The Senate Interior
Committee report on S. 1901, 83rd Congress, states ( S. Rep.
No. 411, 83rd Congress, 1st Sess., page 4):
"The Continental Shelf is defined as the extension
of the land mass of the continents out under the waters
of the ocean to the point where the continental slope
leading to the true ocean bottom begins. This point is
generally regarded as a depth of approximately 100
fathoms, or 600 feet, more or less. In countries using
the metric system, the outer limit of the shelf is
generally regarded as a depth of 200 meters, which is
approximately the same as the 100 fathoms mark adopted
by England and America.
"In his testimony in 1949 before the Senate Interior
and Insular Affairs Committee, the former Secretary of
the Interior gave the following description of the
Continental Shelf:
•These lands begin at the low-water mark along
the open sea, or at the seaward boundary of inland
waters - such as bays, ports, and the mouths of
rivers - and extend seaward for varying distances
at different places.
•The Continental Shelves are slightly sub-
merged portions of the continents that surround
all the continental areas of the earth. Along
some portions of the coasts they are very broad,
gently sloping platforms; and at other places
they are narrow. The outer boundary of each
shelf is marked by an increase in the gradient
of slope of the sea floor. This occurs generally
at a depth of approximately 100 fathoms, or 600
feet. Beyond the 100 fathom line, the outer
slopes of the Continental Shelves are inclined
more steeply toward the ocean deeps.
•Along the Atlantic coast and in the Gulf
of Mexico the Continental Shelves are generally
very broad. Off the New England coast, where the
width is greatest, the shelf extends seaward
about 250 miles. Elsewhere along the Atlantic
coast it ranges in width from about 40 to about
100 miles except for a relatively narrow strip
along the east coast of Florida. In the Gulf
of Mexico the average width of the broad shelf
off the west coast of Florida is about 150 miles,
and elsewhere in the Gulf the shelf is from
40 to 150 miles wide except where the land area
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formed by the Delta of the Mississippi River
has been extended across the shelf almost to
its outer edge.
•Off the Pacific Coast States the Continental
Shelf is relatively narrow, ranging in width from
5 miles or less to a maximum of about 40 miles J"
Why the 100-fathom line was generally accepted as the seaward
limit is not explained in the report except as set forth in
the former Secretary 1 s testimony.
The first action by the United States Government with respect
to the continental shelf was the issuance by President Truman
of a Proclamation (No. 266?) on September 28, 19^5 (59 Stat.
88*0 . That proclamation declared that the United States re-
garded the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of
the continental shelf beneath the seas but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United
States, subject to its jurisdiction and control. As justi-
fication for the proclamation, it was stated that "with
modern technological progress" the utilization of those nat-
ural resources "is already practicable or will become so at
an early date." Nowhere in the proclamation is there any
mention of the seaward limits of the continental shelf. The
press release which accompanied the proclamation (printed at
page 53 of the Senate report) did state:
"Generally, submerged land which is contiguous
to the continent and which is covered by no more
than 100 fathoms (600 feet) of water is considered
as the continental shelf.
"
However, the last paragraph of the press release (at page 5*0
emphasized the importance of technology in determining the
seaward limits of exploitation as follows:
"The advance of technology prior to the
present war had already made possible the
exploitation of a limited amount of minerals
from submerged lands within the 3-mile limit.
The rapid development of technical knowledge
and equipment occasioned by the war, now
makes possible the determination of the re-
sources of the submerged lands outside of the
3-mlle limit. With the need for the discovery
of additional resources of petroleum and other
minerals it became advisable for the United
States to make possible orderly development of
these resources. The proclamation of the
President is designed to serve this purpose."
It is thus clear that at the time when the Outer Continental
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Shelf Lands Act was passed the Congress did not contemplate
the immediate development of areas beyond the 100-fathom line.
The reason that such development was not contemplated was
apparently the existing technological inability to develop
resources at such great depths. Nevertheless, the Congress
did not prescribe a limit on the depth of water beneath which
the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and
may be developed under the act. Without such a seaward limit
it is possible to hold that with technological progress the
act may be applied to areas at greater and greater depths.
The Senate Report also refers to the shelf as extending to a
point where the gradient of the decline of the sea floor has
a marked increase and where the slope to the true ocean floor
begins. Language to this effect is also found in footnote 3
of United States v. Louisiana
, 363 U.S. 1(1960). The deter-
mination of such a point presents difficulty and would re-
quire the careful study of experts in this field. We do not
presume to be competent to determine this point. However, we
note that the sea floor in this general area does not slope
steadily to the true ocean floor. Instead it is cut up with
channels, ridges, and plateaus. This does not, therefore,
appear a satisfactory test of the seaward limit of the con-
tinental shelf. It is not required by the statute, and was
abandoned in the definition of the continental shelf re-
cently adopted by the United States.
On May 26, i960, the Senate ratified the "Convention on the
Continental Shelf" (106 Cong. Rec. 103?4; daily ed. May 26,
i960). That Convention has not, we understand, yet come into
effect, but it may be regarded as expressing the present
views of the United States on the continental shelf. Article
one of that Convention is as follows:
"For the purpose of these articles, the term
•continental shelf 1 is used as referring (a) to
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or,
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of
the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to
the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas
adjacent to the coasts of islands.
This is the first definition of "continental shelf" officially
adopted by the United States which sets any seaward limit.
Though it is not an amendment of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, it is an indication of the extent of the area of
seabed and subsoil over which the United States asserts
jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition. As we have
pointed out above, the Act is applicable to all submerged
lands seaward of the States 1 boundaries of which the subsoil
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and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to
its jurisdiction and control. Since the United States has
now asserted rights to the seabed and subsoil as far seaward
as exploitation is possible, it is clear that the Cuter Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act is now applicable to all these areas.
There is no question that the area designated on the map
which you have sent us falls within the scope of the definition
in the Convention and is, therefore, subject to leasing under
the Act.
It is difficult to see how a case or controversy concerning
our interpretation of the applicability of the statute will
arise under the present circumstances. If the applicant
had proceeded to develop these phosphate deposits without
regard to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, we could
have objected, and on our assertion of the applicability of t
the Act the question could have been settled judicially.
However, here the company has applied for a lease under the
Act and we are aware of no party with standing to object to
the granting of such a lease.
We agree with Mr. Caplan, in his memorandum of April 13t that
there appears to be no reason to regard this area as within
Mexican jurisdiction.
(Sgd) Thomas J. Cavanaugh
Thomas J. Cavanaugh
Associate Solicitor
Division of Public Lands

APPENDIX C
FIGURES I - V
FIGURE I
Total catch, catch per unit of effort, and total amount of








N= .30 .25 .20 .10
F= .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .80







Changes expected to occur in the years immediately following
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